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# West Europe Report

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No. 2197

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## TRAINING, OPERATIONS OF KARHU ANTITERRORISM UNIT DESCRIBED

Force Up to International Standard

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 14 Jul 83 p 6

[Article by Lauri Salonen]

[Text] The Interior Ministry's readiness unit, Karhu [Bear], has maintained a comparatively low profile. Now, however, just before the OPEC conference, they consider it wise to give it a bit of publicity so that elsewhere in the world people can take an objective view of Finland's ability to deal with the threat of terrorism, for example.

Terrorism as such is not a part of Finnish daily life -- in fact it is a quite alien form of crime here -- but a modern state must be ready for anything.

Karhu's commander, who deplores the fact that his name has been made public and expressed the hope that it would not happen again, feels that his unit represents a level of competence with which he has to be satisfied.

"If I wanted them to be better, I would be excessively demanding," he said.

Karhu was founded in 1972 and it has been led by the same man throughout its entire 11-year history.

"We felt that there had to be a special unit like this in the country," the commander told us. "We have learned a lot over the years and our training has improved more and more.

"Over the years we have participated in international competitions with similar units and, after getting through initial difficulties, results are beginning to appear."

The commander of Karhu did not want to make public the strength of his unit, nor more important data on its weaponry. He did not give us anything but general indications as regards training either.



## Excellent Physical Condition

"Among other things, our strength lies in the fact that the 'other side' doesn't know with what kinds of weapons and experience we are deploying. We can, however, say that we provide the same kind of training as other similar units operating abroad do. Adapted to Finland's conditions and Finnish laws.

"The job we are being trained for governs the kind and level of training.

"I can say this much, that psychological training occupies an important position in our training. In this kind of work self-control and cool deliberation in any situation are the key to everything. On the other hand, versatile mobile training is also indispensable since we can't do our jobs sitting down in actual situations. Excellent physical condition is demanded of the men.

"Different kinds of tactics and technical knowledge of the equipment we have to use are also part of our training. Mastery of the equipment must be complete.

"Familiarity with tactics is especially important and with the aid of our imagination we try to predict probably or possible action targets and situations," the commander of Karhu said.

According to the commander, Karhu members must be mentally well-adjusted and have a certain positive attitude toward life. They must also feel that what they are doing is right.

"We don't need any overheated types. We accept calm policemen for training.

"People often think that there are awfully tough guys in such special units. As for me, I would say that our men are mainly particularly well-balanced individuals."

And that is understandably perhaps the most important thing. It guarantees expedient action by the men in crisis situations.

## Two Real Situations

So far Karhu has been very rarely employed in our country in real situations -- as one might guess, in such a peaceful country.

"We have had to take care of two small hijackings of planes," the commander of Karhu said disparagingly. "One was the so-called Lamminparras Case in 1978 and the other was the hijacking of an Aeroflot plane to Helsinki, which occurred a year before that.

"Both cases were resolved without firing a shot," the commander emphasized. "If we start shooting, you can be sure that the situation is in a bad way. That's really an extreme measure."

Karhu is not composed of any fixed organization, merely a group of men who are composed in the way required by each case.

"Naturally, we have joint exercises and so forth, but we don't really have an organization," the commander said.

#### Special Unit Competition

"We were the best non-German team in the last annually organized competition in the Federal Republic of Germany; we took fourth place. In the contest employing five-man teams we failed to take second place by only one shot that missed by 2 mm."

The competition comprises events that require a variety of skills: strength, endurance, agility, courage and a sure trigger finger.

"In the competition first there is a 3-km obstacle course during which you run to the top of a mountain, among other things. I myself have run the course and I can tell you that it's hard work to run to the top.

"At the start you come up against a 2.5-meter-high vertical wall obstacle, which is followed by a 20-meter-long, over half a meter in diameter pipe that you crawl through," the commander recalled.

"Then after the tunnel comes the hike up the mountain I mentioned and, when you come down from it, there's a long rope waiting for you, which you slide down and at the end of which you have to drop to the ground. After that you swing along the horizontal bars for a distance of 15 meters only with the strength of your hands.

"After the final mussing up and shooting contest, you still have to go through the 'waves of the Danube': 130 cm up and after a meter 60 cm down, then 130 cm up and all over again.... They try to raise the pulse rate with this.

"Then you run several hundred meters and revolver firing may begin. Each competitor tries to hit five clay pigeons. We hit 24 out of 25 pigeons and, since you're penalized 30 points for those that have not been hit, we dropped two places lower to fourth place. We were 24 points short of the silver medal."

#### No Adventure, Just Work

"Lastly, you fire several different weapons, with your right hand, with your left hand, with both simultaneously, from several different distances and at many different kinds of targets.

"You fire so-called spontaneous shots from the hip, quickly. You fire long and short bursts with automatic weapons and in addition with a rifle.

"The maximum number of points you can score throughout the whole ordeal is 3,500; we racked up 3,312.

"There were 12 teams from five different countries competing. In the Netherlands, as competitions by invitation only, they have three times organized games consisting of special shooting contests applicable only to these special units and we have placed third each time."

Judging from what Karhu's commander had to say, we understand that the Finnish special unit is at the very least rated as particularly good.

"If I as their commander were to place higher demands on my men, they would probably be very high... although, of course, you always ought to set the mark higher.

"When all is said and done, I would stress the fact that this is a very serious business and that there is no reason to lay emphasis on any sensational contributing factors in connection with it."

Precisely. The combatting of new forms of violence is more than an exciting adventure. It is a tough, demanding job in which mistakes are not permitted.

Composed of Policemen

Helsinki KANSAN UUTISET in Finnish 16 Jul 83 pp 2-3

[Article by Jukka Parkkari: "Police 'Bear Gang' Got Its Basic Training in West Germany"]

[Text] At a press conference organized on Tuesday it was "revealed" to news media representatives that Finland too has its own police unit specialized in antiterrorist activities. That same evening brief glimpses of the unit's training exercises were presented on both television channel newscasts.

The special unit was deliberately reported on just before the start of the OPEC conference and the approaching MM [World Championship] track and field games. On both of these occasions this unit, known by the name of "Karhu," will be fully ready for action.

Interior Minister Matti Luttinen justified the announcement of the existence of the special unit on the basis of the fact that doubts have from time to time been raised abroad as to whether Finland is in any way particularly equipped to deal with potential terrorist strikes.

Actually, for a long time now not only the police, but also many other people, for example, editors, have been very much aware of the existence of the Karhu unit, or "bear gang." The unit was founded as early as 1974 and basic familiarity with that field of operations was obtained by sending several Helsinki policemen to the Federal Republic of Germany to be trained by special unit police there.

## Munich and Mogadishu

The FRG was chosen as the place to gain basic familiarity with the field because a couple of years earlier a special unit had been founded there to concentrate on the combatting of terrorism.

This unit was formed immediately after the bloodbath of the Munich Olympics. It was felt that the events leading to the deaths of several hostages were chiefly attributable to the West German police's lack of expertise in handling the matter.

At the end of 1972, in affiliation with the West German Border Patrol, Grenzschutzgruppe 9 (GSG 9), or Border Patrol Unit 9, was founded, a unit which 5 years later became famous through its assault on a hijacked Lufthansa plane at Mogadishu Airport.

The operation was successful. Three of the hijackers were shot dead and one was taken prisoner, badly wounded. They succeeded in rescuing the plane's passengers with only four of them being wounded slightly. Only one of strike force GSG 9's men was slightly wounded.

The success of the men of the West German special unit was not, however, entirely due to their own merits; rather they had long before received help in their training from the SAS [Special Air Service] unit, which is part of England's Royal Air Force and which had familiarized itself with antiterrorist operations in Northern Ireland.

In the actual attack at Mogadishu Airport too, two SAS experts participated, whose technical assistance was considered to be quite decisive to the success of the operation.

The same SAS later distinguished itself in the Falklands War commando missions, among other operations.

## Regular Policemen

In a sense the Finnish Karhu unit is quite different compared to similar foreign units. The bear gang is composed entirely of men who daily perform regular police chores and are only assembled to carry out special assignments when the situation demands it.

Foreign units, which have started to come into existence in nearly all European countries, generally exist only for antiterrorist operations. They have no other duties than perhaps at the most protecting people at certain important events.

Shortly before the Mogadishu operation, GSG commander Ulrich Wegener did indeed complain that his men were beginning to be frustrated over the training exercises that had then been going on continuously for 5 years. Wegener wanted to "engage the enemy."

The Finnish special unit is not, of course, nearly as powerfully equipped as, for example, GSG 9, which has a huge amount of all sorts of equipment, among others its own helicopter squadron.

It is also reported that Karhu's equipment is up to international standards and the competence of its men is emphasized in the statements made by officials these past few days.

The number of men involved was not revealed but the bear gang has probably trained several dozen men, from among whom the unit is composed only of the size required at any given time.

Bear gang members have quite successfully participated in police special unit competitions in the FRG. It is reported that the Finns recently placed fourth, which also means that Karhu men constituted the best non-German team.

#### First Plane Highjacking

Karhu was founded a year before the Helsinki CSCE, at which time it was already in operational readiness. The bear gang was, however, not needed during the conference, although it had been feared that a Japanese terrorist group, which despite thorough searches at the time they found no trace of, had infiltrated the capital.

Karhu did not really go into operation until July 1977 when two young Soviets highjacked an Aeroflot plane on the regular run from Petroskoy to Leningrad and forced it to land in Helsinki.

The bear gang put on their bullet-proof vests, pulled their helmets down on their heads and started to plan how to capture the plane, but they did not have to go ahead with it because the highjackers began to release the passengers held as hostages in small groups and now and then ordered pornographic magazines for themselves to read. The police obligingly rushed the boys some sex magazines of the KOTILIESI type.

In the end fatigue won out and the highjackers surrendered. They were immediately taken into custody by the heavily armed bear gang, which had to admit that the highjackers' sole weapon was a practice hand grenade.

#### Preparation for a Terrorist Operation

A year later there was another highjacking in which Karhu was needed. Business college graduate Aarno Lamminparras, who has since become famous, was responsible for that one at the end of October and the start of November 1978. He forced the highjacked plane to be flown over Finland and Northern Europe for 18 hours before he left the plane on his own in Oulu and fled to his former home.

Flying after the highjacked plane to Oulu, the bear gang had to go and get Lamminparras at his home, but they did not have to fire a shot.

Real international terrorism has not yet once struck Finland, although it has been claimed that the world's most famous terrorist, Carlos, has visited our country.

We have, however, obtained information on one case that may be regarded as a preparation for a terrorist operation. Foreigners working in Helsinki restaurants had for a fairly long time been keeping their eyes on a certain embassy and the movements of embassy personnel. The security police directed their attention to the case and the observers were expelled from the country before the help of the bear gang was needed.

Up until last week Karhu tried to be particularly inconspicuous. It did not even have any sort of official organization that would appear in communiques made public by the Helsinki Police Department. In one paper "they reported" on the bear gang discreetly as follows: "On orders from the Interior Ministry the Helsinki Police Department also to a certain extent concerns itself with the organizing and preparation of special security actions for the entire nation."

Right from the start, the police inspector who heads Karhu has wanted to remain unknown. Now he is particularly unhappy over the fact that his name was leaked to the public in connection with the television news.

#### Karhu Would Have Been Needed

This special antiterrorist unit was really founded in Finland decades too late. In the 1930's, with Lapua movement terrorists ravaging the whole country, it really would have been needed.

At that time many leftists were captured and taken to the eastern border. Many of those kidnappings ended in the murder of the kidnap victim. The police at that time proved to be particularly ineffective in investigating those cases, to say nothing of preventing terrorist actions.

The "bear gangs" of those days only rallied a bit when former President K.J. Stahlberg was also carried off by extreme-Right terrorists.

11,466  
CSO: 3617/160

## GUARDIA CIVIL OFFICIAL ON SECURITY IN BASQUE AREA

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 2 Aug 83 p 4

/Article by Jose Macca/

/Text/ Yesterday, sorrow and indignation spread through the Basque Country because of the resurgence of terrorism which claimed the lives of two civil guards last weekend. There was also a grenade attack on the Vizcaya military government building in Bilbao. The minister of the interior, Jose Barrionuevo, together with the captain general of the VI military area, attended the funerals of the two murdered civil guards in Zarauz. The head of the interior ministry urged the companions of the victims to struggle against terrorism with the authority granted them by the democratic representation of the government. There were shouts against the ETA /Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group/ and expressions of grief. The State attorney-general has begun proceedings to rule on whether the leaders of Herri Batasuna /Popular Unity/ are criminally responsible as possible inciters of terrorism. Civil Guards sources complained of the ease with which the ETA is killing members of the Institute. Nevertheless, despite the risks the Civil Guard has 4,600 new applicants this year. Very soon these troops will reinforce the troops stationed in the Basque Country--those who do the most fighting against the ETA and who are most exposed to their crimes. Lt Col Ayuso, head of the supervisory service of the Civil Guard, stated that, "we cannot keep civil guards on the northern coast because they kill us."

Madrid--The head of the Civil Guard's supervisory service, Lt Col Ayuso, said that "we cannot keep civil guards on the northern coast because they kill us." And he ruled out the possibility of a "symbiosis between contrabandists and terrorists." Despite the risk, 4,600 applicants this year have passed the entrance exams to become professional civil guards.

"There is very little possibility of fighting smuggling effectively in the Basque Country, because we have hardly any civil guards patrolling those coasts. We cannot do it, because they kill us." These statements were made by Lt Col Ayuso, chief of the supervisory service of the Civil Guard, just a few days before the murder last Sunday of two civil guards, while they were guarding the latest boats seized for contraband off the Guetaria coast in Guipuzcoa. In the course of the interview, which in a

way forshadowed this double assault, Lt Col Ayuso evaluates the situation as regards smuggling which has arisen since the breaking-up of the infrastructure in Galicia, and the hypothesis that these traffickers are moving their center of activities to the coast of the Basque Country, where a symbiosis is being established between the smugglers and the terrorist movement.

Lt Col Ayuso indicated that "even with the breaking-up of the infrastructure of smuggling, especially of tobacco, in Galicia, this type of activity is not going to disappear in Spain. This is only a case where one infrastructure is destroyed until another is set up again." To confirm this, the head of supervisory control in the Civil Guard already has specific information on his office desk. The press and information media have reported that there is a possibility that the Asturia coast could become the new site for the landing of contraband, but what is really happening is that the ship that does not enter and does not unload in San Sebastian or in Guipuzcoa, in the Deba or Orio River, continues to Bermeo. Substantial seizures have already been made on the Deba and Bermeo coasts. Lesser quantities have been seized in the interior of the Basque territory. Of course, there have not been any seizures on the coast of Asturias and Santander."

#### Terrorism

Lt Col Ayuso ruled out the hypothesis that the Galician smugglers or any other type of mafia associated with this activity had a "symbiotic" relations with terrorist organizations. "No. The only thing that is happening is, simply, that the **smugglers** have moved toward the north, as was natural for them to do. There are great problems for us in carrying on surveillance in the Basque Country, because we have more serious matters to contend with. There are great opportunities for **smugglers**. There also are no surveillance ships as of now, although a new ship has been ordered."

Lt Col Ayuso acknowledged that "the way against smuggling is less effective in the Basque Country than in any other part of Spain" because of the problems posed by the terrorist movement.

#### Applicants

On the other hand, so far this year 4,600 applicants have passed the exams for "professional civil guard and auxiliary civil guard," as we published in the magazine of the Corps.

In the entrance examinations for the 1984 class of professional civil guards, which took place in January, a total of 1,000 applicants passed, of which 453 were "sons of the Corps." The exams for the 1985 class, which were held in June, resulted in 600 people passing, 258 of whom were "sons of the Corps." As for the auxiliary civil guard, 1,000 applicants passed the exams in the first session, of whom 151 were "sons



of the Corps." In the second session, the total number of applicants rose to 2,000, all "sons of the Corps."

#### Modernization

The Civil Guard will be able to obtain information from every place in the country in a matter of seconds, thanks to a new communications system, the Ministry of Defense reports.

As of now, the Civil Guard is installing an information system in all its vehicles whose nerve center is a data bank located in the administrative office.

The telecommunications equipment for the infrastructure of the new system, which was contracted for in public bidding, will be provided by three companies: Cemtys S.A., six stations Blu of 100/150 watts; Philips Iberica, S.A., 540 and 220 portable VhF and UHF radiotelephones, and Telettra Espanola, S.A., two multi-channel telephone systems.

8131

CSO: 3548/482

## SWEDEN WEIGHING WHETHER TO PURCHASE GAS FROM NORWAY OR USSR

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 5 Aug 83 p 20

/Article by Mert Kubu/

/Text/ Can Sweden afford natural gas? Shall we buy from the Soviet Union? Do we dare count on natural gas from Norway?

Sweden faces a hard choice. Up to now the international natural gas prices have been too high. Oil and coal have been clearly cheaper. In addition, we have our even cheaper nuclear electric power. But natural gas prices are under pressure.

## Gas For Sale

The difficult dilemma of the Minister of Energy Birgitta Dahl (Social Democrat) is how to succeed with the trick of simultaneously decreasing dependence on oil and ending nuclear power. And this without sacrificing any of our big rivers or building coal-fired power plants along our coasts. Buying natural gas is one possible piece of the puzzle in this complicated energy equation.

The critical question is the gas prices. Can we afford them? The investment of billions in pipelines and long-term contracts make the purchase of gas risky. Just now gas prices are not as high as a few years ago. There is plenty of gas on the market. The Norwegians, who are selling the most expensive gas in Europe, think that the Russians are dumping. Whatever Sweden does, a position must be taken: for or against.

Natural gas can be used by industry. About a million small houses are today heated by electricity. If nuclear power is phased out, no one knows how they will be heated. Natural gas would be an alternative for the small houses. The problem is only that the need will materialize first after the year 2000.

## Secret Agreements

It is not only the price which is a problem for Sweden.

How long will we have nuclear power? If we buy gas, where will the pipelines be placed? Natural gas pipelines are long and expensive. They require the investment of many billions. And if pipelines are built, you are boxed in. It

takes at least 20 years to depreciate a gas pipeline under the Gulf of Bothnia to Finland and on to the Soviet Union. The pipeline itself may last for perhaps a 100 years. But how are guarantees obtained for assured deliveries?

Both buyer and seller of natural gas lie in wait on each other and try to protect themselves as much as possible. Therefore, natural gas agreements are complicated. In addition they are always secret. Few people have a full picture.

The fact that natural gas is beneficial for the environment favors its purchase. Natural gas is burned without the risk of sulphuric dioxides. It contains almost no sulphur. Nor is there a problem with heavy metals. There is a risk of explosions, not least at the large compressor stations.

#### Danish Natural Gas Expensive

Sweden has prospects for purchasing gas from three countries. We have already a gas agreement with Denmark. But it does not involve particularly large quantities. Moreover, this gas is expensive for Sweden.

Negotiations with the Soviet Union and Finland will start this autumn. Sweden has to decide if it is interested in joining up with Finland and buying gas from the Russians.

We can probably make the first gas purchase from Norway. It would be the most secure. But it is still the most uncertain project.

The State Power Board at the behest of the government determined how a gigantic pipeline could be laid through Sweden down to the continent. The idea is that this line would be able to transport annually up to 25 billion cubic meters of natural gas. That is just as much energy as is produced by about 25 nuclear power reactors....

It would be possible then to tap off some natural gas for Sweden. About 4 to 6 billion cubic meters. That is a lot of energy.

The plans of the State Power Board are elaborated in three books, and they want to continue with detailed planning of the gigantic gas line which would cost about 20 billion Swedish kroner to build. That would give a lot of jobs to Swedes.

#### Two Small Cruxes

There are, however, two small critical points with the big project. The gas which would be transported through Sweden to the continent is expected to be taken from the gas field 300 meters deep far up in northern Norway outside Tromsø. About 200 billion cubic meters are found there. But the Norwegians must find at least 600 billion cubic meters for the gigantic pipeline to be profitable. The Norwegians will only know at the earliest in 1987 if so much gas exists.

And even if there is adequate gas, it is possible that the Norwegians may lead the pipes along the Norwegian coast.

Norway's large and known reserves of natural gas lie south of the 62nd parallel. The largest reserve, "the Troll field" contains 1,600 billion cubic meters of gas. It will take 50 years to empty Troll. The gas from this field is sold via a pipeline to West Germany, The Netherlands and other countries. It goes via Emden. Two pipelines from Norwegian gas fields go to Great Britain.

Thus, Sweden's only possibility for getting gas is via Emden-Denmark. But that is not particularly realistic. It would be all too expensive.

#### Own Gas

Today the price of Norwegian gas (cash-and-carry in Emden) is 1 kr 6 ore in Norwegian money. The Russian gas is 25 percent cheaper in West Germany.


The quality of natural gas varies. But the rule of thumb is that a cubic meter of gas gives just as much energy as 10 kWh (kilowatt hours) electricity.

The Swedish natural gas company Swedgas has calculated that Russian gas would pay if the price per kilowatt hour gas energy at Gavle would cost at the most 10 Swedish ore. Thus, at the one krona per cubic meter. But that price should also cover transportation across Finland and under the Gulf of Bothnia.

Natural gas involves not only economy and technology--but also to a great extent politics. The United States tried, among other ways through economic sanctions, to prevent the NATO countries in Western Europe from concluding a new gas agreement with the Soviet Union. The Reagan administration failed in this. Now at the international organization, IEA's, the United States's and Norway's interests coincided. The Norwegians are consequently expecting that next time West Germany will sign an agreement with Norway and buy natural gas from the Troll field--even though this gas will be more expensive than the Russian.

There are gas experts in Sweden who think that we should buy gas from both the East and the West and that we should link together the pipelines. In that way there would be greater security for gas deliveries, technically as well as economically and politically.

It is possible that we shall also find our own natural gas. Under Lake Siljan. In any case the State Power Board will drill there.



Key:

1. The cash-and-carry price for Norwegian natural gas in Emden: about 1 Norwegian kroner per cubic meter. This produces just as much energy as 10 kWh (kilowatt hours) of electricity. On the continent this is considered a high price.
2. The Danish gas is taken from the North Sea by Esbjerg. A consortium has a concession on the gas way in to the 21st century. The gas is sold at an expensive rate to the Danish gas company, Dong, which in turn sells some of the gas to Sweden, at a very expensive rate.

3. The world's largest natural gas resources are found in the Soviet Union. They are located in the Ural Mountains. The Soviet Union sells much gas to Western Europe, but a branch pipeline goes via Leningrad to eastern Finland. It is being proposed to extend it from there to Helsinki and then under the Gulf of Bothnia to Sweden. The Russians are being enticing with "low" gas prices.
4. High up by Tromso the Norwegians have found about 200 billion cubic meters of gas. They must find three times that much before a gas pipeline through Sweden to the continent will pay for itself. The State Power Board has already planned how the gas pipeline would be laid out, but the Norwegians will only know at the earliest in 1987 if there is sufficient gas.
5. The Tromso gas would be forced forward in a gigantic subterranean pipeline by some 10 compressor stations.
6. The Troll field is Norway's biggest natural gas reserve. There are 1,600 billion cubic meters of gas here. But at a depth of 300 meters.

6893

CSO: 3650/262

## RECENT FIND IN KATTEGAT STIMULATED BALTIC OIL SEARCH

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 4 Aug 83 p 6

/Article by Olle Rossander/

/Text/ The area of the Kattegat where the Danes are now hoping to find oil basically belongs to the same geological formation which has given the enormous oil finds in the North Sea, the natural gas finds in The Netherlands and the large coal fields in Germany.

It is a broad belt of sedimentary rocks, the remains of plant and animal life from millions of years ago, stretching from the Atlantic far into Poland and the Baltic area.

Oil and natural gas have been formed not only under the bottom of the North Sea and in The Netherlands.

For several years Sweden has been pumping up small quantities of oil on Gotland. There are in northern Germany several functioning oil wells, as well as large deposits of gas. Oil has been recently found along the coasts of East Germany and Poland, and at the moment intensive boring is being carried on in the sea off Poland.

Small quantities of gas have also been found in Scania, and several holes have been bored, and careful seismic investigations made. But the probability for any large find is not regarded as very great.

Secret

Swedish Petroleum, which is responsible for the Swedish search for oil, does not wish to make any comment on the possibilities of Denmark or Sweden making any great find. Nor do they want to take up the results of previous Swedish investigations. It is a business secret.

The best prospect for a Swedish oil find is in Gotland and in the sea east and south of Gotland. No trial borings have been made in the sea east of Gotland since Sweden has there a border conflict with the Soviet Union. In this case, Sweden is taking a position directly opposite to that being taken in the border conflict in the Kattegat.

## High Pressure

The first prerequisite for finding oil in this area is that great quantities of organic material, plant and animal parts, were deposited here millions of years ago in such great beds that under high pressure they decayed and were converted into oil, gas or coal.

In order to form large quantities of oil or natural gas the bed of sediment must be several kilometers thick. In addition there must be over the oil a bed of somewhat porous rock through which the oil can be forced by pressure. Finally there must be above this a tight bed of rock which contains and preserves the oil.


It is these special characteristics which geologists are looking for with the help of seismic investigation and trial borings.

"The chances for a large find in Denmark and Sweden are small since there has been much fissuring of the rock, and the oil and gas which was formed has seeped out and evaporated," says Erik Norling at The Swedish Geological Research Institute (SGU).

"The beds are also thinner on the Swedish side, and that makes the chances for a large find smaller."



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CSO: 3650/262



Key:

- |           |              |                 |                      |
|-----------|--------------|-----------------|----------------------|
| 1. Oil    | 5. Denmark   | 9. GDR          | 13. France           |
| 2. Gas    | 6. North Sea | 10. FRG         | 14. Shetland Islands |
| 3. Norway | 7. Baltic    | 11. Belgium     | 15. USSR             |
| 4. Sweden | 8. Poland    | 12. Netherlands |                      |

## PRINOS OIL EARNINGS INCREASE

Athens | KATHIMERINI in Greek 9 Aug 83 p 7

/Text/ Our country's earnings from the exploitation of the Prinos oil deposit reached 7 billion drachmas according to Minister of Energy-National Resources E. Kouloubis who visited on Sunday the oil and gas production platforms in Prinos and the land installation in New Karvali.

Regarding the oil production, the minister said that it has reached 25,000 barrels a day which is the maximum and that until now 15 million barrels have been extracted (20 million tons).

It was added that through the desulfuting of the oil, 100,000 tons of sulfur were produced, which was used by chemical industries; this was also true of the gas. Kouloubis also said the oil drilling "Ammodis 2" in the area around Thasos has found a deposit of crude oil which is not exploitable now but in the future it may be possible to utilize it in connection with Prinos.

New explorations, he added, will soon take place in the western sea area of Thasos where it is believed there are oil deposits.

7520

CS0: 3521/403

## ELECTRICITY PRICE RISES IN OPORTO PROTESTED

Lisbon DIARIO DE LISBOA in Portuguese 3 Aug 83 p 8

[Excerpts] The new electric power rates for the Greater Porto zone were approved yesterday by the executive of the Porto Municipal Chamber, with the PS [Socialist Party] and the PSD [Social Democratic Party] voting in favor, the APU [United People's Alliance] and the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] opposing and Chamber President Paulo Valada abstaining. Thus, in an edict issued by Minister Veiga Simao, it was determined that there will be a fourfold increase in power rates, that is, from 1.40 to 4.67 pesos per kilowatt (for residential consumption) and from 3.45 to 7.10 pesos per kilowatt (for commercial and industrial consumption). According to APU councilman Oliveira Dias, this decision "requires the agreement of the Municipal Assembly, which ratified another Chamber proposal a few days ago." It has not yet been determined when the new rates will go into effect.

In a communique released yesterday, the APU declared that "the Porto Chamber yielded to pressure and to the antipopular policy of the government." The communique notes that, "taking advantage of the month of August, when most Porto residents are vacationing, the PS and the PSD presented a proposal which was approved...and with intolerable consequences for the public. Residential electric power rates will immediately increase by 500 percent, and 600 percent within 6 months; for commercial and industrial consumers they will increase 700 percent." The communique adds: "The brutal increase in electric power rates, as the APU has constantly stated, are neither socially just nor economically inevitable. They result from the policy of capitalist recovery, the attempt to destroy and dismantle the EDP [expansion unown], the total submission of prior governments and this government to the interests of American imperialism and to the business of buying nuclear plants from the United States instead of using the nation's energy resources. Moreover, the Porto region is in a very unusual situation with regard to electric power, the result of a policy of encouraging consumption in the region, which has been practiced for decades."

6362

CSO: 3542/201

## EXPORTS TO CEMA RISE; TRADE DEFICIT DROPS

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 9 Aug 83 p 7

[Article by Erich Hoorn, DIE PRESSE]

[Text] Despite the economic slowdown in the CEMA countries, Austria has been able to increase her exports to Eastern Europe during the first half of 1983. Since she was able to cut her imports at the same time, her trade deficit has dropped significantly. CEMA debts with Austria probably have continued to rise. However, trends differ very significantly from country to country. For instance, while shipments to Romania declined markedly, the GDR enjoyed an export boom.

Austria's trade deficit fell to 1.7 million schillings during the first half of 1983, compared with 4.8 million schillings during the same period a year earlier. This is primarily the result of the large decline in energy imports. Not only did the volume of imports drop considerably, but also prices came down, which had an especially serious effect on total imports. However, Dr Alfred Mayer, head of the Federal Chamber of Commerce's Eastern Division, is not particularly enthused about this greatly diminished trade deficit since it was accomplished not by more exports but by less imports. Because, from a global point of view, this also means that export opportunities to Eastern markets are diminishing. Mayer expects a levelling-off of current trends in both directions as early as during the second half of 1983.

The semi-annual statistics show again that CEMA should not be viewed as a uniform bloc. Because trends vary considerably from country to country. Exports increased the most with the GDR. The increase is primarily due to shipments for a steelworks in the GDR. The favorable trend of exports to Poland is only relative because no

export successes could be achieved with that country in recent years. The volume of shipments has now reached the 1976 level. The surplus Poland has achieved in her trade with Austria will not even be sufficient to cover interest payments for debt servicing. To do that, Poland would have to use all her export earnings with Austria, while not importing anything from there.

The USSR and Bulgaria remained good markets. Disappointing, on the other hand, were exports to Hungary. However, that country has put on import brakes in view of its large debts, and Austria, too, feels the effects. As a result of that action, the GDR, after the GDR, now ranks second among Austria's Eastern customers.

Dr Jan Stankovsky, foreign trade expert of the Economic Research Institute, emphasizes that it has been possible to increase CEMA's share of total Austrian exports from 10.4 percent during the first half of 1982 to 11 percent at present. However, during the same period, imports declined from 11.2 to 10.1 percent.

CEMA's total debts with Austria, totaling approximately 117 billion schillings at yearend 1982--exact figures are not available because they are confidential--, should have risen further this year: the GDR, Czechoslovakia and also the USSR have obtained new credits. After Poland, the GDR is Austria's largest debtor country.

AUSTRIA'S TRADE WITH CEMA,  
First Half 1983

|                | Exports<br>(bill. schill.) | +<br>-<br>%<br>first half 1982 | Imports<br>(bill. schill.) | +<br>-<br>%<br>first half<br>1982 | Balance<br>(bill. schill.) |
|----------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Albania        | 0,05                       | 15                             | 0,09                       | - 38                              | - 0,04                     |
| Bulgaria       | 1,1                        | 39                             | 0,2                        | - 35                              | + 0,9                      |
| Czechoslovakia | 1,6                        | - 0,8                          | 3,6                        | - 0,7                             | - 2,0                      |
| GDR            | 2,8                        | 79                             | 1,3                        | - 7,8                             | + 1,5                      |
| Poland         | 1,1                        | 12                             | 1,3                        | - 10                              | - 0,2                      |
| Romania        | 0,5                        | - 5,5                          | 0,7                        | - 2                               | - 0,2                      |
| Hungary        | 2,5                        | - 25                           | 2,4                        | 6                                 | + 0,1                      |
| USSR           | 5,2                        | 13                             | 7                          | - 21                              | - 1,8                      |
| CEMA-Europe    | 14,85                      | 6,3                            | 16,59                      | - 11,4                            | - 1,74                     |
| World Total    | 133,5                      | 0,3                            | 163,7                      | - 1,7                             | - 30,2                     |

## METAL WORKERS UNION CHIEF POULSEN CRITICIZED

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 21 Jul 83 p 7

[Article by Ake Ringberg: "Danish Workers Protest: We Do Not Want to Become Capitalists"]

[Text] The Danish Federation of Trade Unions (LO) plans to establish an investment company for the purpose of initially investing 500 million kroner in industry got the first negative reaction from union workers last Wednesday. Georg Poulsen, the head of the Metal Workers Union, was severely criticized by the organization's left wing.

"We do not want to become capitalists," said one branch of the Metal Workers Union in response to LO's plans to invest part of the huge capital it has on hand. Initial opposition has come primarily from branches within the union which are headed by communists of various shades, who view the LO leadership and the Social Democrats as "obedient organs of a capitalistic society." It is no accidental occurrence that Metal Workers' Union chairman George Poulsen is being targeted because he represents the union right wing and is among those who openly recommended political cooperation with Denmark's nonsocialist parties, primarily Poul Schluter's Conservative Party.

Opposition to the use of union money for investment purposes rather than strike funds, in particular, has come from various LO quarters in Denmark, but, at least in the beginning, also from the Industry Association. However, since the association's position was originally adverse and negative, it was followed by a revised opinion: "Money has no odor."

## Plenty of Money

The funds considered for capital market investments by the union are for the most part strong ones: the pension funds, which total almost 42 billion kroner, the so-called Cost-of-Living Fund 14 billion kroner and the Supplementary Pension Fund (ATP) 23 billion kroner. In addition to that come

union strike funds, the value of real properties, etc and, finally, the National Bank of Labor, which last year showed a profit of 147 million kroner.

Altogether, LO has more than 100 billion kroner at its disposal and that does not include all the strike funds. Industry Minister Ib Stetter welcomes the LO initiative and considers it in line with the government's own wish to create more capital willing to take a risk in industry through the investment in stocks.

#### Grossly Neglected

One group of LO members in particular has worked on the project, but this group has had the expert help of former Social Democratic ministers, principally former Finance Minister Knud Heinesen and former Labor Minister Svend Auken.

Last Wednesday, another leading Social Democrat, Mogens Camre, countered critics among employers who do not fully trust LO's attempt to manage investments. "What do you think we will do with the money?" Camre asked in an article in BERLINGSKE TIDENDE. "Well, in any event, we will not produce tax-free income, or close profit-making firms and move them to countries where they pay low wages or increase private fortunes." Camre pointed to one reason for the deep economic crisis in Denmark, with over 10 percent unemployment, namely that various governments have grossly neglected to switch to the new and improved technology and thus a greater savings and investment quota, which is one stipulation for maintaining competitiveness in a constantly changing world.

8952

CSO: 3650/251

## BRIEFS

ELECTRIC CAR PLANT TO EXPORT--Denmark is now going to become a car-producing country, but will only produce 50 cars to start with. If expectations are met, production will hopefully reach 10,000 models a year. This will be an electric car with a fiberglass body, to be produced in northeast Jutland with government development aid. The car is designed to accommodate two adults and two children. The price is expected to be 50,000 kroner and most of the production will be exported. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 21 Jul 83 p 7] 8952

GREATER INDUSTRIAL SECTOR EMPLOYMENT--Between April and May, there has been a small rise in the number of workers employed in industry. The number of industrial workers increased from 348,600 to 350,100. The increase of 1,500 occurred solely among blue-collar workers, while white-collar employees remained unchanged at 104,100, a report from the Danish Bureau of Statistics shows. The number of workers in industry rose from 244,500 to 246,000 between April and May. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 11 Jul 83 p 4] 6578

CSO: 3613/173



## REPORTED ECONOMIC MISTAKES AFFECT PARTY RELATIONS

Athens 1 KATHIMERINI in Greek 9 Aug 83 p 1

/Text/ The recent economic measures, and especially the new real estate tax based on standard prices for the various areas in the Athens region, have caused serious frictions within the government. Many complaints have reached Kastri, regarding the arbitrary and uncoordinated way the economic policy is carried out, especially as evidenced by the devaluation of the drachma and the law on real estate.

The accusations are directed against the two top economic ministers, Ger. Arsenis and D. Koulourianos who are held responsible for the economic stagnation.

The accusations now become specific and relate to the various sectors of economic policy. It seems that the premier himself encourages this criticism, who listens to the complaints and on occasion appears to agree to the charges leveled at the two economic ministers. On the other hand, the ministers claim that the measures they take have the direct and personal approval of Premier Papandreou, and attribute to others the "hints" passed directly or indirectly to the premier.

On the devaluation of the drachma, the critics accuse Minister of National Economy Arsenis. Although he has been in charge of the economy for the past 2 years he has been unable to understand its basic problems. Even from the top of the government, close associates of Papandreou characterize the Arsenis policies as amateurish, leading mathematically to the economy's stagnation. They note particularly that a month from now the negative effect of these measures will be felt more accutely and the government as a whole will pay for their political consequences.

They also tell the premier that the two economic ministers, because they do not have any direct contact with the productive classes and the working people, cannot grasp the political consequences of their measures which may chart indelibly the course of the governing party. They also hold responsible the two ministers for the failure of the preliminary effects of the 5 year plan which have not convinced anyone that the government has an economic policy to deal with the crisis.

## The New Real Estate Tax

Objections on the real estate tax come even from PASOK organizations, especially those which have people familiar with housing. These organizations claim that these measures will kill all construction in most areas, with a rapid rise in unemployment. They add that it is doubtful that tax revenues will increase with these measures. It is more likely that real estate transactions will stop altogether. They charge the minister of finance with total inability to balance the budget he himself has put together and for this reason he resorts to all kinds of gimmicks to collect money. But this, they add, will have the opposite result because it will shrink even further the already anemic building activity and as a result tax revenues will go down vertically.

7520

CS0: 3521/403

## NO IMMEDIATE GAINS SEEN FROM BASES' AGREEMENT

Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek No 484, 29 Jul-4 Aug 83 p 19

/Article by Ev. Androulidakis/

/Excerpt/ Finally, it happened what all expected anxiously and at times with apprehension, but also with certainty. For this reason few were surprised or impressed from the Papandreou announcement that on July 15 the agreement on the American bases had been initialed. The inexhaustible dexterity of the PASOK chairman worked well again.

First, because with the procrastination of the negotiations diverted to a large degree the attention of the public from the downslide of the economy but also from unpopular measures designed to reverse this course. At the same time he pushed forward basic institutional measures (the supervisory councils in enterprises, the socialization, health, public administration) which lead to the socialist transformation through the one-party state.

Second, because the method for informing public opinion on the course of the negotiations gave the picture of a government engaged in a battle for national independence and pride, a picture which was completed with the premier's statement that an agreement was initialed for the "removal" of the American bases from Greece.

Now what does this agreement say about the bases? The premier said a lot about the agreement but he himself--and even more so the government spokesman Maroudas--suggested patience. Patience until the full text of the agreement is made public. From an economic standpoint what is the significance of the happy ending of the base uncertainty? The short and crisp answer is "many and significant effects." True, we did get, like the Turks, the payment of rental for the operation of the American bases on our soil. But we got \$500 million in aid/loans which we do not know as yet if it will be paid in a single installment and when. In any event, it is a generous injection into our prostrated balance of payments and above all a significant expansion of our borrowing capacity which had declined significantly because of the rapid rise of our foreign borrowing, but also, mainly, because of our changes in our foreign and domestic policies. In mid- and long-term our economic benefits may become decisive, contributing to the recovery of our economy. But such a development requires a change in the psychological climate created by PASOK's policies.

Having reached the point where we were not given even short-term commercial credit, in spite of the crisis and the harsh competition, to induce foreign investors to invest in our country, it will be necessary to create a special regime for foreign investors, an action which, however, is ruled out by the anti-capitalist and anti-multinational sloganeering of PASOK--or by expanding the steps taken by the governing party when it accepted the induction into the EEC and also accepted the American bases. The ample and cheap funds our country needs to come out of the deep swamp of crisis only in the West and more accurately in the United States can be found. But to cross our borders--after the 500 billion dollars the West loaned to the Eastern Bloc and the Third World countries and is in danger of losing--it is necessary to create conditions we do not have. Our over-versatile premier will have a hard time in trying to dress up those conditions in a socialistically acceptable garb.

The government's next step is the one which will count the benefit from the agreement on the bases. These benefits are not going to be immediate. For this reason it would be unwarranted to claim hastily that the signing of the agreement opened the way for foreign investments, or even an increase in our exports to the United States or of the tourist current to our country.

The political climate spoils easily but it is very hard to improve and restore it. In our view, the climate is very bad in spite of the first significant steps. What will the government do from this point on?

7520

CS0: 3521/407

## FALLING EXPORTS TO ARAB WORLD, EASTERN BLOC DETAILED

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 28 Jul 83 p 13

/Text/ The negative results of the export activities to the Eastern countries and the Arab world during the first 5 months, January-May 1983, show the complete failure of the policy of "openings" followed by the government in the 20 months it has been in power.

This was the view expressed by exporters who analyzed the recent export data published by the National Statistical Service. The declining value of exports is expressed in drachmas, giving a distorted picture since the transformation of foreign exchange into drachmas in 1982 resulted in 18 percent more drachmas than in 1982 /sic/. Therefore, the achievements of 1983 must be estimated at an 18 percent level lower than what is shown in the data.

But even with the fictitious blow-up of the drachma comparison, the course of our exports to the Eastern countries and the Arab world was negative during the first months of this year.

Specifically, the exports to the Soviet Union declined from 5,386.1 million drachmas in 1982 to 5,067.2 million drachmas in the corresponding period in 1983; to Eastern Germany from 506.3 million dr. to 214.8 million; to Poland from 443.3 million to 114.2 million; to Czechoslovakia from 1,731.9 to 549.6 million. Insignificant--in drachmas--was the decline in exports to Romania and Bulgaria while a small increase was registered in the exports to Hungary.

In the exports to the Arab world, more spectacular is the decline to Libya, Egypt and Iraq and less to other countries. Specifically, the exports to Libya declined from 3,127.9 million to 2,858.8; to Egypt from 4,544.3 to 3,845.3 million; to Syria from 1,639.8 to 1,360.2 million; to Iraq from 3,851.5 to 1,470.8; to Kuwait from 1,196.8 to 1,033.5 million drachmas.

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CSO: 3521/407

## GOVERNMENT EXPRESSES CONCERN ON ECONOMY

## Expenditure, Imports Containment

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 3 Aug 83 p 1

[Excerpts] "The government is looking at the economic and financial difficulties from the standpoint of a new overall and coherent policy, given that the situation has reached an extremely serious point, but also in the conviction that it could be overcome with firmness, determination and political will," says a communique from the Council of Ministers for Economic Affairs, which met yesterday in general session, with all the ministers attending, to discuss economic and financial policy in preparation for the draft proposal for the General State Budget and the Grand Options of the 1984 Plan.

According to the communique: "The government confirmed its previous orientation that the measures demanded by the situation must be taken immediately and decisively, placing necessity above considerations of political expediency." The council determined "the drafting of the necessary measures, which will be duly announced."

The Council of Ministers analyzed the estimated figures and programming of the deficit of the General State Budget and the Balance of Current Transactions, as well as the principal macroeconomic issues. According to the communique, particular attention was given to the "position to take regarding the public business sector. A permanent task force was designated to give continuing and coordinated attention to the problems in that sector." The task force includes the secretaries of the treasury, planning, finance, industry, energy, the Merchant Marine and transportation.

The communique of the Council of Ministers for Economic Affairs also noted that "the government is engaged in preparing, to the extent possible, an adequate response to the negative effects of the unavoidable austerity measures, already taken or to be taken, on the living standard of the Portuguese people."

The government has determined to place quotas on imports of consumer goods until 31 March 1984, reducing them to 1975 and 1976 levels. The decision was announced yesterday in the DIARIO DA REPUBLICA, in a joint dispatch by Ernani Lopes, minister of finance and planning, Soares Costa, minister of agriculture, forestry and food-stuffs, Avaro Barreto, minister of commerce and tourism, and Veiga Simao, minister of industry and energy. The measure is justified by the need to reduce the balance of payments deficit. The quotas take in the period from 1 April 1983 to 31 March 1984 and refer specifically to durable consumer goods. For each quota, a sum

equivalent to 15 percent will be reserved for companies which did not import in 1975 and 1976 and which apply within the established periods.

#### Serious Foreign Debt Problem

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 3 Aug 83 p 3

[Text] "Looking forward 2 to 6 years from now, our foreign debt will be one of the most serious in the world, in relation to our population of a few million," Mota Pinto said in Pombal at the end of a dinner given by his fellow-countrymen, which lasted until early yesterday morning.

Referring to the foreign debt/export indicator, the deputy prime minister and defense minister concluded that, "if we compare the size of the debt and our export figures, we will see that countries which are known to the world as having a very large foreign debt, such as Brazil and Mexico, are in a more favorable situation."

Mota Pinto reiterated that, in certain respects, the debt is not alarming, because of Portugal's large gold reserves, but he stressed that "they are not worth much from an economic standpoint. They are valuable as security for our creditors."

On the other hand, Pinto noted that the major problem with respect to the foreign debt is that of having to try to "effectively reverse the accelerated rate at which the foreign debt is increasing," an opinion which has been repeatedly defended by government economists, who stress the impossibility of suddenly doing away with the debt and the need to moderate and control its growth.

6362

CS0: 3542/197

## SWEDEN PAYING OFF INTERNATIONAL DEBT INSTALLMENT EARLY

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 5 Aug 83 p 7

/Article by Bjorn Anders Olson/

/Text/ Sweden has begun to pay off in advance its first big international loan. It is being done, partly to save money, and partly to avoid the big payments which would otherwise have to be made 1986-87.

Sweden has still very good credit despite big deficits. This means that Sweden was able earlier this year to take a big dollar loan, which in addition has a lower interest rate than earlier loans.

Therefore, Sweden is now hastening to take new loans to pay off the old ones in advance.

Sweden took its first big foreign loan--a billion dollars--in 1977, a 10-year loan at an interest rate 5/8 percent over Libor (London interbank offered rate).

That loan is to be repaid during the years 1985-88. What Sweden has now done is to repay 200 million in June and in August a further 100 million dollars. These are repayments which actually should be made during the years 1986-88, years which are already hard pressed by other repayments.

#### Lower Interest

Another reason for paying now is that the new loans, which Sweden is making, have a lower interest rate--Libor plus 3/8 percent compared to Libor plus 4/8 percent. Consequently, the National Debt Office saw the possibility for a savings in costs by repaying now and replacing the old loans with new, cheaper loans.

Otherwise, the rule-of-thumb is that one borrows--for example dollars--when the exchange rate is high, for that gives the best exchange in Swedish kronor, and pays back when the exchange rate is low, and thus repayment does not cost as much.

The fact that the National Debt Office is doing just the opposite--the dollar exchange rose on Thursday again to a new high, 7.8275 per dollar--is, nevertheless, not as significant as it appears.



One simply replaces dollars with dollars, and the transaction has no direct impact on the Swedish flow of foreign funds.

Otherwise, one should, as said, borrow foreign currency when the exchange rate is believed to be the highest.

On the other hand, he who for example borrowed 100 million dollars in 1976 received 390 million Swedish kronor. If the loan were to be repaid today, the repayment sum would be 782 million kronor, plus all the interest.

6893

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MINISTER: SCHOOL TEXTS DISTORT NATO, NATIONAL DEFENSE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 31 Jul 83 p 10

[Article by Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen]

[Text] BERLINGSKE TIDENDE has asked Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen to review four booklets on security policy that have just been published. These publications are intended for educational purposes and were brought out by the Samtid Publishing Company. The minister's conclusion is that the booklets, with one exception, give young people a poor foundation on which to discuss security policy. In his view, they simply lack integrity.

Myths are best dispelled with the help of facts. And there are many myths in the discussion of peace and security. Therefore there is a great need--especially for school instruction purposes--for honest and comprehensible descriptions of the extremely complex problems that lie behind the debate on some of the most urgent problems of our day.

It is a debate that both in Denmark and in many other countries has become far more intensive and involved than it was in the past.

However there is no doubt that recently the debate has had a tendency to bog down in unrealistic positions and far too often, slogans have replaced common sense and down-to-earth arguments for people's own viewpoints. The myths have taken root.

More instruction and information in this area is needed and both here and abroad a lot of new material has come out in the last couple of years. For example, the Security and Arms Reduction Policy Committee has issued a good many excellent publications over the years, but unfortunately they do not seem to have gained wide circulation--and they are not really suitable for use in the classroom.

Not much has been published that is specifically aimed at the voters of tomorrow, the upper grades of elementary school and vocational and academic

high school students. Therefore it was with special interest that I looked at four booklets on security policy, each about 50 pages long, which Samtid just released.

The series is supposed to be aimed specifically at young people.

The four booklets are: "Danish Security--a Debate Book," "The ABC's of War" by Bertel Heurlin, "Negotiations and Fear" by Hakon Wiberg and "An Arms Build-Up for Peace?" by Maja Naur. In September a fifth booklet, "The Peace Movement," by Torben Storner will be released.

Actually I would like to have had the last book included in my stack, for there is certainly good reason to analyze peace movements in greater detail, but unfortunately I had to restrict myself to the first four pamphlets in the series this time around--with uneasy apprehension about the fifth work that is meant to complete the whole series.

The important question here is whether we have a series of booklets that will give young people an objective or at least well-balanced basis on which to discuss security policy.

Unfortunately, we must reach the conclusion that this is not the case.

The only one of the four booklets that presents matters almost without bias is Bertel Heurlin's "The ABC's of War."

It is a survey that provides an easily-read and instructive presentation. (Although here and there it is marred by annoying printing errors, for which we can hardly blame the author.)

Hakon Wiberg's pamphlet on "Negotiations and Fear" is not as well-balanced as Bertel Heurlin's--but even so it contains many good observations and concrete information.

But it is obvious that personal sympathies overwhelmed the author in the last part of the booklet, which deals with the peace movements.

There are also some problems with the next to the last section on the discussions and negotiations in recent years on arms reduction and arms control. Let me give a single illuminating example:

In his discussion of nuclear-free zones, Wiberg states that one of the prerequisites for establishing such zones is that the participating countries are not bound by military alliances in such a way that under certain circumstances they would be forced to allow nuclear weapons to be stationed on their territory.

And he goes on: "This prerequisite is not met in the Nordic region. For example NATO can force its member nations to accept nuclear weapons in

special situations." That statement is news to me and I would like to see some evidence for it. It is a sovereign Danish decision whether or not we will permit the stationing of nuclear weapons, just as it was and is a sovereign Danish decision that we will not permit deployment under the present circumstances--or as the most recent Social Democratic government put it: "under the present circumstances, in other words, in peacetime."

Then we come to the real problem children, Maja Naur's booklet on "An Arms Build-Up for Peace?" and finally the debate book.

Maja Naur's book has what must be regarded as the advantage of not being easy to understand. It contains so many categories and models that it would be hard to swallow even for more experienced readers than those for whom the book is intended.

It is a more serious matter that Maja Naur's pamphlet does not even aim at a minimum of objectivity. The rest of this space could be used on a detailed review of this, but I will just give a few examples:

Maja Naur talks a lot about wars. This is backed up with a lot of statistics and wars are classified by geographic areas, number and period. But aside from a few vague references, we never find out which concrete wars Maja Naur is using in the statistics and thus we are unable to test the validity of the classification or the many general statements.

Here are just a few illuminating quotes that illustrate this:

"From the time NATO was established in 1949 until 1968, one or more NATO countries took part in 45 of the 78 wars. Thus NATO membership has not worked to keep the peace.... NATO countries stopped fighting on their own territory after World War II. Instead they have fought wars in other lands around the entire world.... The pattern of the Warsaw Pact is different. In the first place, these countries have taken part in far fewer wars, 15 compared to NATO's 45. In the second place, in most cases they have been fighting with each other."

Quite aside from the fact that the reader has to search for the figure of "78 wars" elsewhere in the pamphlet, but in vain, only to find out that it was another irritating printing error (there were 87, not 78), I would like to know just how many school children would realize immediately that neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact have participated as alliances in any war and that the entire basis for the further argument has already been so distorted for this reason that it cannot be used for anything at all.

Nor should it be unknown to Maja Naur that according to its treaty, NATO consists solely of the North Atlantic area, that according to the same treaty NATO is defined as a defensive alliance and that this defensive alliance in the area it includes has not taken part in a single war, any more than it has participated in any wars outside its sphere of responsibility.

The last part of the pamphlet is used for a popularized mishmash of the ideas of Galtung and Oberg, which I am sure neither would recognize. On the last page of the pamphlet, we end up by seriously considering shutting down all ministries, after first moving the Ministry of Fisheries to Esbjerg, the Finance Ministry to Roskilde and the Foreign Ministry to Odense. The reason for the moves is said to be that "their work might be influenced more directly and to a greater extent by the people whose interests the ministries are supposed to be safeguarding."

With all due respect to the residents of Funen, I would be the first to say--but let it pass. It is hard to take this sort of thing seriously.

Things are no better when we come to the debate book. I will not make any attempt here to comment in detail, but I would simply like to say that the booklet, which has 15 contributors, purports to present "widely differing points of view on what is best for Denmark's security."

The 15 contributors cover a total of 50 pages, including illustrations. Flemming Schroll Nielsen, Lars Poulsen, Finn Jorgensen and Arne Christiansen take up a total of 10 pages. This is supposed to represent the right-wing view. Lasse Budtz--writing, very appropriately, under the heading "Social Democrats for a New Nuclear Weapons Policy"--takes up 3 pages. But to be on the safe side, we also get 3 pages of Jytte Hilden.

The remaining 34 pages belong to those who have monopolized peace in this country, but the Committee of Cooperation on Peace and Security has the most space! Such an arrangement just cannot be taken seriously.

Finally, the booklet is supplied with a list of words whose definitions are quite in line with the major impression given by the rest of the pamphlet. Example: "Capitalism, the name of a social system based on private ownership of the means of production, factories, land, machinery, raw materials, etc., where individuals can profit from having others work for them in contrast to socialism." And just before that, "Iron Curtain" is explained like this: "Term for the border between the socialist countries and the capitalist countries in Europe, often used by people with a right-wing orientation."

That is a great help for school children. I hope the booklets mentioned last do not become widely circulated in the educational program. They are not honest. If they could not have been written better, it would have been better if they had been left unwritten.

But Heurlin's book in particular shows that it can be done and that is really the only encouraging element in this otherwise distrustful picture in which propaganda cliches have replaced information and good common sense in far too many cases.

6578  
CSO: 3613/173

## SOCIAL DEMOCRATS ATTACKED FOR LACKING ALTERNATIVE POLICIES

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 31 Jul 83 p 10

[Editorial: "The Opposition's Policy"]

[Text] The opposition in Folketing consists of the Social Democrats. There are other opposition parties, of course. But the Social Democratic Party is the big party that represents an alternative government possibility.

But today it is hard to see that the Social Democrats fulfill any function as a viable government alternative. As Mayor Hans Thustrup Hansen put it in a recent article in BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, the constant theme of the Social Democrats is that the government's policies are asocial, that the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. The economy has not really improved at any point and the positive tendencies that have to be conceded in spite of this are said to be due to outside forces.

At the same time the Social Democrats have been strong opponents of the government's income policy and in Folketing they have opposed public savings cuts and have criticized the government's exchange rate policy, while also taking strong exception to the consideration of privatization.

All this negativeness, however, has not prevented leading Social Democrats, led by former Finance Minister Knud Heinesen, from trying to soothe the public and business circles with declarations that of course an eventual Social Democratic government would continue the income policy, maintain the exchange rate of the kronen, continue the efforts to reduce the state deficit, etc.

What are we to believe? Apparently the Social Democrats want to have it both ways. Criticize the government's policies and change them completely around, but still continue the most essential elements of government policy. Is the public witnessing internal disagreement in the major party or total desperation over the loss of government power and the success of the nonsocialist government?

The Social Democrats are assuring business circles that there is no reason to fear the possibility of a Social Democratic government. At the same time the party says it wants to shift even more costs over on businesses through shorter working time and a costly reform with paid time off for training. The party wants to forcibly collectivize the same business sector through OD [Economic Democracy] legislation and it wants to implement fund taxation. Through political propaganda, the party is also trying to make the public believe that the cuts in social budgets are quite inadmissible and must be reversed. In any case this would mean new increases in public spending and in taxes.

It is hard to reach any other conclusion than that the Social Democrats are quite incapable of running the government at this time. That is a shame, for in reality this means that Folketing lacks a real opposition.

6578

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## PAPER CHARGES PROGRESSIVE PARTY OUT TO DESTROY COALITION

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 11 Aug 83 p 6

[Editorial: "Self-Destruction"]

[Text] It almost seems as if the Progressive Party wants to destroy itself--in more than one sense--from within. The reports from the joint meeting between the party's executive committee and its Folketing group seem to indicate this. They have imposed a stand on themselves that can only be regarded as an ultimatum to the government. This stand was dictated by the party's campaign leader, who as we all know is no longer a member of Folketing. There is no reason to overdramatize the decisions that were made at the meeting, but there is good reason to formulate some words of warning for the Folketing members who through their votes can ultimately determine the fate of the party.

When Folketing stopped working before the summer recess, it occurred under circumstances that came close to forcing the government to call an election. The Progressive Party had no unified stand, but it was quite clear that there were people in the party who felt that they had had no opportunity to exert an influence on the government. The result was that Folketing approved a resolution that called on the government to establish the "closest possible cooperation with all parties that want to assist in the necessary policies." On that basis, the government has announced that it will hold talks with the parties over the next few weeks.

If the Progressive Party is serious when it complains about not having influence, it is contradicting itself by making demands in advance--before any talks have taken place--that are of such a nature that they could very well make negotiations impossible. A party that wants to help decide what is going to happen must necessarily adjust itself to the fact that the compromise that must be found presupposes a willingness to make concessions. It is not just the government parties that must display this willingness, but to an equally high degree the parties that would like to help make the decisions. The Progressive Party has been around Christiansborg long enough to know that.

If there is no willingness to hold real talks and to show the flexibility that is the prerequisite for results, the outcome could be a dissolution



of Folketing. What would be the advantage of an election for the Progressive Party? In any event an election contains the risk of a shift to a Social Democratic government that would deprive the Progressive Party of any chance of participating in making decisions. It is more likely that the four government parties will return with even greater strength to continue their work and the Progressive Party will experience new reverses at the hands of the electorate. Do they think this would increase their chances of exerting influence?

The Progressive Party can destroy itself if it keeps on serving as the arena for a personal and political drama.

6578

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## FRG-TURKEY RELATIONS, ZIMMERMANN'S TRIP VIEWED

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 29 Jul 83 p 4

[Article by Nina Grunenberg: "There Is No Cure"]

[Text] For years German politicians have been avoiding the "Turkish problem." Not a single member of the social-liberal coalition ever went to Ankara to present openly to the Turkish government German concerns about the 1.7 million Anatolian foreign workers. The indecision in taking action sprang from a bad conscience that strengthened the awareness that the problem could hardly be blamed on the Turks, who were looking for work and food, but possibly on the boundless rapacity of the Germans who, in the golden age of recruiting foreign workers, only had to pay DM 300 in administrative fees in order to "buy" a Turk. Since the military putsch in 1980, Bonn's policy of laissez-aller could be justified additionally with the distaste which the "partial dictatorship" of the Turkish generals had aroused.

The conservatives in the Kohl cabinet do not seem to be willing to let anything in this dichotomous restraint apply to themselves. Without regard for the political quarantine which the nose-wrinkling West had imposed on its partner in the alliance, three top-level German politicians stormed the Anatolian plateau to define "German interests" in Ankara: The reigning Lord Mayor of Berlin, Richard von Weizsaecker, Minister of Labor Norbert Blum and Minister of the Interior Friedrich Zimmermann. Without any fear in the face of 48 million offended Turks and an easily excitable press, which had grown accustomed to regard the FRG as the 68th Turkish province in the best Ottoman conqueror tradition, each of them --in his own way--gave the Turks a piece of his mind.

The first was Richard von Weizsaecker, as the mayor of Berlin at the same time the head of the largest Turkish city on German soil. His charm captivated the Turks from the first moment. In their eyes he embodied the German type that they revere, ever since Helmut von Moltke was instructor of the Turkish troops in 1835: white-haired, with natural authority, ethically cultivated and with a feeling of responsibility for the teams. They recognized that Weizsaecker is not in a position to do much for them, but that did not diminish their enthusiasm for him.

Minister of Labor Norbert Blum was the next visitor. His task was to make those in power in Ankara understand the price of the Turkish foreign workers returning--

a difficult undertaking, in which, according to reports, Bluem was helped neither by his courteous nature nor by his native wit. Not even his prominent rank in the Bonn government impressed his hosts. For inexplicable reasons, which lie as much in the Turkish mentality as in the Oriental subtlety with which they master tactical matters, they treated him with a condescension, the inimitable style of which is still guaranteed by the Sublime Porte. Clearly they felt themselves doubly justified in this behavior, after Bluem had revealed himself to be a member of the working class and had brought up his reminiscences of his time as a German foreign worker in Turkey: For a short time he had worked as a bricklayer on the Ankara opera house. In the eyes of the Turkish upper social stratum these are lapses in taste which it fails to comprehend. According to their ideas, workers belong on the building site, not in positions of power.

The fronts seemed to be clearly drawn for the opening of German-Turkish hostilities when Minister of the Interior Friedrich Zimmermann set out on Monday last week as the third man. Turkish newspapers had drawn a veritable portrait of horror of him for their readers. He was described as strong and humorless, as hard and cynical. "A piece of heavy artillery from Bavaria" was CUMHURİYET's headline for its welcoming article. It concluded with the comment that its readers should not be surprised if Zimmermann shouted "Turks go home" as he disembarked from the airplane in Ankara. When a German Television crew drove into an Ankara suburb the next evening to capture the mood, they reported fearful, trembling people who were kept awake by the name "Simmermann."

The Turkish press played a problematic role in German-Turkish relations. It is impossible to ignore the fact that criticism of Germans has had a relief valve function since the military seized power. There is no penalty for talking about "Almanya"--which is quite different than talking about their own generals, who have not tolerated political criticism. Among Turkish intellectuals, particularly the journalists, the familiar "German glance" from the Nazi period is now conspicuous, to assure themselves that no one can overhear them. Many have become so cautious that they totally avoid conversation with foreigners.

There is another break which has had a lasting destructive effect on the frame of mind between Turks and Germans: the introduction of visas in October 1980. The number of Turks applying for asylum in the FRG--recruiting had been stopped in 1973--has dropped drastically since then--from 57,000 in 1980 to (an estimated) 1,500 applications this year--,but they have not recovered from the blow. The Turks felt particularly bitter that the neighboring European countries followed the Germans' lead in introducing compulsory visas. The Turks do not have many friends. The fact that the Germans, in spite of everything, are still among their best friends does not make it easier to bear their injured pride. The indifference with which the Turks take note of German military and economic aid as a natural entry fee and not in the slightest as an additional effort is indicative of this. It can even render diplomats speechless.

It is worth mentioning a third point to round out the multilayered, convoluted situation which Zimmermann faced in Ankara. The Turkish government--regardless of whether it is a military or civilian government--fears nothing more than the return of the Turkish foreign workers from Europe. The absence of 2 million Turks

is firmly planned into the sparse Turkish state budget. With a birth rate of 2.1 percent and a hidden unemployment rate of 25 percent, those in power are happy about each one that they do not have to feed.

In addition, the Turks are divided in their attitude to their emigrant workers. This comes out in the word "Germanics," which the Istanbul press regularly uses to describe Turkish foreign workers. The "Germanics," it is said, are more qualified and more disciplined than others, but they also no longer conform. Those who stayed at home fear that the returnees will push them out of the labor market. They also have social demands that any Turkish government has to render hopeless. Social unrest would be the logical consequence if larger numbers returned. Many Anatolians are living on the money of the foreign workers. Their situation would deteriorate if the "Germanics" no longer shared with them.

The prospect that the Turks dream about when they think of the standing army of emigrant workers that they have in Europe--exactly 300 years after the battle for Vienna--goes in a direction that is quite different to what many Germans can imagine. The Turks hope that their emigrant workers will continue to keep open the road to the West, for which they have only half decided, in spite of the reforms of Ata Türk. They dream about a Turkish lobby in the heart of Europe. It is to be at least as free with money, as influential and as powerful as the Greek, Polish or Jewish lobby in the United States.

It was not for nothing that the Turkish problem was protracted for so long by German politicians. Anyone can feel himself overloaded in this situation. Only one did not: Friedrich Zimmermann. The energy, precision and resolution with which he completed his visits to the offices in Ankara would make the hair of any decent liberal stand on end. At the same time it was hard not to be impressed by it. Human destinies and emotional considerations did not count in his view of realpolitik. In their stead sober interests were weighed, first the German, then the Turkish. "We will make a serious effort," he promised his counterparts in the discussions, "not to create any injustices, but to come up with regulations that serve both sides. Our discussions are intended to provide a calculate preview."

With respect to the renewal of the aliens law, two points are particularly important for him.

First, he wants to impose an age limit of 6 years for children who follow their parents later. The Turks resisted this plan vehemently: They preferred to send their children to the 5-year elementary school at home--not only because it is more convenient when both parents were working, but also so that the children remain Turks. In order to awaken their comprehension, Zimmermann pressed this argument to them: "A 6-year old child who goes to school in the FRG has a 98-percent chance of completing high school. The child has the same chance as German children of finding a teaching position and making something of his life. On the other hand, a child who is not brought to Germany until he is 15 years old and speaks no German only has the opportunity of enlarging the force of those out of work and of turning to crime."

The second point concerns marriageable young Turks from the second and third generation of emigrant workers who normally fetch their brides from Turkey. Zimmermann wants to put an end to this, unless the Turks have acquired German citizenship. The following numbers are used in the argument: There are 900,000 young foreigners who are less than 20 years old and who do not have EEC citizenship. If only one out of three marries, there are 300,000 brides following their husbands, 200,000 of them of Turkish origin. "For these facts," Zimmermann is in the habit of saying, "there is no cure. A further increase in the number of foreign workers is unacceptable for the German population."

The objective of his policy concerning aliens is not only stopping the growth of the emigrant worker population but an annual reduction of about 20,000. Divorced wives are also to be sent home. Their residence permit is to expire with their divorce: "Come together, go together," is the German Minister of the Interior's brief explanation. When a German journalist protested and asked whether the women would be sent away forcibly, his reply was: "The position of women in Turkey is different than in our country. We want to conform to customs in Turkey."

So far no one has had the courage, but also the honesty and the straightforwardness to show such rock-hard decisiveness. Oddly enough, the first ones to notice this and to include it in their calculations were the Turks themselves. As soon as they knew where they were with him, they treated Zimmermann with the greatest consideration. The external sign of respect was the number of escort vehicles that Turkish protocol suddenly dispatched on the evening of the first day (five escort cars, six motorcycle riders, by comparison: Norbert Blum had only one car in his escort).

What did the Turks see in him? Like the Germans, they have a weakness for strong men. Like the Germans, they are capable of a severity that puts everything else in the shade. Perhaps they perceived, as they were listening to Zimmermann's short, precise presentations, a distant echo of their own despots--from Suleiman the Magnificent to Ata Turk. With their primeval instinct for power, they know above all who is the victor and who can only be second. That was clear after Zimmermann's arrival. For this reason he could fly home with the conviction that "intellectually there is some movement" with the Turks.

Where does this leave German-Turkish friendship? We would prefer not to talk about it. It was a feeling that was always stronger on the Turkish side than on ours. This relationship has always suffered from a lack of solid foundations. But one thing is certain: No one around Zimmermann mentioned a new attack on German-Turkish friendship, which has almost been worked to death.

9581

CSO: 3620/421

## POLITICAL, ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH ARAB STATES

Hamburg AUSSENPOLITIK in German No. 3, 1983 pp 236-242

[Article by Volkmar Koehler: "Questions of German-Arab Cooperation"]

[Text] The growth of the Arab states' importance to the FRG over the past decade borders on the dramatic. On the one hand, the oil price increases have resulted in dangerous turmoil, while on the other hand the resulting demand for industrial goods significantly helped our exports, our economic activity, and our employment. Foreign policy cooperation is determined by the Near East conflict in which the FRG holds very clear positions; however, the FRG cannot resolve the conflict but it can help the parties to reach this goal. In the growing links of the economies of the Arab world with those of the European world, Dr. Volkmar Koehler, parliamentary state secretary in the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation in Bonn, first dwells on the FRG contributions. Up to the end of 1982, commitments amounted to DM 11.1 billion, nearly DM 10 billion of it for financial and technical cooperation; measured by population, that is three times as much as for all other developing countries. Technical cooperation for a fee reached a volume of approximately DM 360 million, triangular cooperation in third countries amounted to about DM 200 million and in joint projects in third countries with a total investment volume of almost DM 12 billion, the FRG share was about DM 2 billion. But the author points out the fact that the unfavorable overall national and international economic conditions in the future will also affect the development budget; just as the proceeds from oil are declining, there will likewise be a reduction in the countries' own development plans and the allocation of aid to others. From these facts the author derives a series of proposals to rethink

German-Arab relations that ought to be tackled now before the force of circumstances necessitates action under pressure.

German-Arab cooperation is being shaped today by the economic and political developments of recent years. Headline events frequently let us forget that historically German-Arab relations have grown over more than a thousand years. There have been conflicts in the neighborly relations of our peoples. But in the first place, the coexistence has been characterized by mutual spiritual stimulation. In this connection it has to be noted that it was the Germans who have taken more than they have given.

#### Starting Position

The growth of the Arab states' importance to the FRG over the past few years borders on the dramatic.

--The energy source oil is a lifeline for production, growth, and employment; its sudden price rise resulted in dangerous turmoil for the German economy and with it the entire world economy. If the decline in oil prices developed into a catastrophe, a renewed similar turmoil could not be ruled out.

--The demand of the Arab oil countries for German industrial products in recent years significantly helped exports, and thus our economic activity and employment.

--International conflicts, especially in the Near East, are an extremely explosive political subject for the FRG, too.

There is a glaring disparity between the importance of the Arab states to our country and our knowledge about them and also our preoccupation with them. To rethink the current problems of German-Arab cooperation thus has been an urgent task for along time.

Today foreign and economic policies are in the center of German-Arab cooperation. However, extensive and important the narrow field of development cooperation may be, nevertheless it is not in the center of attention. It is being decisively shaped also by the other spheres of policy.

#### Foreign Policy Aspects

In terms of foreign policy, our cooperation is primarily determined by the Near East conflict. This conflict is one of the most explosive and at the same time one of the most tragic of our time. Here hundreds of thousands of people are affected who

for decades have been deprived of peace, security, and homeland, to say nothing of development. The political desire to find a solution however must not give way to hopelessness in the future either. Just now for the first time in years there are again chances for a peaceful solution. The year 1982 did bring the Israeli invasion of Lebanon but with President Reagan's initiative it has also brought about a stronger and trailblazing engagement of the power that holds significant cards in its hands. In 1983 the Declaration of Fez was achieved in which the Arab states approved the principle of a negotiated peace. The PLO has also declared its support of this declaration in Algiers in January 1983. This is a further sign that a process of rethinking is underway. But there continue to be seemingly insurmountable obstacles to a peaceful solution. Nevertheless there is a chance to overcome the stagnation. However, to achieve this end requires great efforts, imagination and also--on both sides--readiness for reconciliation and abandonment [of force].

The attitude of the Federal Government has been clarified on numerous occasions during recent months. In agreement with the European partners, our goal is a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace through negotiations, under renunciation of force. This includes that the right to selfdetermination of the Palestinian people must be implemented just as the claim of all states of the region, that is to say also Israel, to a secure existence. Therefore, the Federal Government encourages the Arab countries to continue along the road indicated by the Declaration of Fez.

In view of the tragic events of the past, we have a relationship with Israel that must do justice to special moral standards. Therefore, the FRG has special obligations to Israel's right to exist and to its right to security. However, this cannot prevent us from condemning a unilateral establishment of facts blocking the road to peace, such as for example Israel's settlements policy in the occupied territories. Nor can it mean that we do not include the Palestinian people, where possible, in the benefits of our development cooperation. Federal Chancellor Kohl has aptly described our role in the conflict when he said we must "seek ways without illusions but with vigor to bring the parties involved in the conflict closer to peace. We cannot solve the conflict but we can help the parties reach this goal."

In other conflicts in the region, the signs for peaceful solutions are also increasing. Thus the Sultanate of Oman and the DPRY, despite many years of seemingly irreconcilable tensions have now found the way to the negotiating table. In addition, the West Sahara problem appears to have come at least closer to a solution. All these measures are to be welcomed because they aim



at a peaceful compromise of the parties to the fighting, while maintaining Morocco's sovereign claims.

### Economic Links

In an economic respect, oil is the element that links our countries.

In the fifties and sixties, oil was inexpensive on the international markets and the price remained stable. The consequence was an industrialization with high energy input also in the FRG. The traditional energy sources, wood and coal, were increasingly replaced by oil. It was not until the drastic oil price increase by OPEC in 1973 that we became aware of the economy's high degree of dependence on imported energy. These and other oil price increases have cut down economic growth and led to higher rates of inflation. Nonetheless, the economic consequences in the FRG--in contrast to a series of other countries, especially also the developing countries--were not as serious as initially feared.

The so-called oil crisis even had positive aspects. The consumers were encouraged to economize, domestic sources of energy again became more attractive, the search for alternative sources of energy, such as the sun and wind, were intensified with success. These processes of adjustment are still in full swing. The latest price developments indicate, however, how difficult the adjustment processes are, painful for the participants and unpredictable in the result.

### Development Cooperation

Development cooperation with the Arab world is part of the German Third World policy. It serves the economic and social development of our partner countries but is also an expression of our effort for good relations. Today we are cooperating with nearly all Arab countries in one form or another, including with the Arab League. This ranges from the classical "development aid," that is to say financial and technical cooperation, via academic and occupational training of citizens of these countries in Germany, to technical cooperation for a fee. This technical cooperation for a fee is a form of cooperation primarily maintained with the oil-rich countries of the Gulf region.

By the end of 1982, the FRG had made commitments to all Arab countries totaling DM 11.1 billion, including nearly DM 10 billion for financial and technical cooperation. Based on population, this aid is three times as much as that granted to all other developing countries. This indicates the importance

that we attach to the Arab world. But this also shows the outstanding role that development cooperation with the Arab world plays.

The above-mentioned bilateral contributions are supplemented by the contributions that the Federal Government passes on via the multinational institutions, such as the EC, the World Bank, or the United Nations.

It is the goal of this cooperation to make a contribution to overcoming poverty in the Arab states and to participate in a balanced development. In doing so, we are trying to take into account the most important economic bottlenecks. The regional emphasis has been placed on North Africa and on the poorer countries of the Arab Peninsula.

Most Arab countries are lowland states in which an official infrastructure must first be established. Moreover, water is one of the factors on whose availability the standard of living and the development depend. Therefore, measures in the infrastructure area play a priority role (32 percent of the funds). In the same breath, the productive sectors are to be mentioned (31 percent), above all agriculture. It continues to be the most important occupation for the majority of the people. In third place are education and training (11 percent) as investment for the future, especially for the young people who no longer are able to earn their living in agriculture.

Arab countries are not merely recipients of German contributions. They have rather a give-and-take relationship in the sense of a genuine partnership:

--There is the earlier mentioned technical cooperation for a fee. This is being done primarily with Saudi Arabia. Its volume in the past was approximately DM 360 million. Emphasis was placed on vocational training.

--In addition, there is also true triangular cooperation. Here technical knowledge and deliveries in kind are being readied by the FRG, while Saudi Arabia takes care of financing. Thus far projects valued at about DM 200 million have been carried out above all in African countries.

--Joint projects were carried out to a significant extent in third countries. Up to the end of 1981, there were 23 such cofinancing ventures with Arab donors. With a total investment volume of just under DM 12 billion, the German contribution amounted to approximately DM 2 billion.

Future development cooperation will take place against the background of unfavorable overall national but also international conditions. FRG domestic economic problems, 2.5-million unemployment, and a far-reaching crisis of the public budgets in the long run will also affect the development budget. It is true, it was possible to increase the budget appropriation once again this year but that will undoubtedly no longer be possible during the coming years. Other Western donors clearly reduced their funds already in 1983.

The oil-exporting Arab countries, especially the Gulf states, are also important donors of development aid. Thus Qatar at any rate sets aside 12 percent of its GNP for the Third World and Kuwait, 7 percent. But the reduction of oil proceeds will limit also in these states not only their own development plans but also their willingness to award development aid to other countries.

#### Consequences and Prospects

These developments will soon force us to rethink German-Arab relations. Shouldn't we anticipate these developments and do our rethinking now when the force of circumstances is not yet upon us, and we do not have to act under time pressure? Therefore, here are some proposals from the angle of the development politician that are to stimulate discussion:

1. The relations between the West and thus also between the FRG and the Arab countries in recent years were shaped by the "recycling" idea. A constantly growing share of our national product flowed into the oil-producing Arab countries and the West did everything possible to get back as large a share of it as possible.

This must not be the determining factor of our cooperation in the long run. What must be done is to achieve true, relevant cooperation in genuine partnership and while respecting the position of the other party in each case.

2. The development policy cooperation with the Arab states will be continued. In addition to the quantity of the contributions, the quality of the aid must play an increasing role in this connection. Our development policy priorities are identical with the needs of the Arab states: foodstuffs production, water, environment, education, and training. Over and above the pure transfer of funds, increased "policy dialogue" on common-interest fundamental questions of development could also play a role.

3. A subject of special importance in this connection is the promotion of regional groups in the Arab area. There have been a

whole series of attempts which--if they had been successful--would have been able to contribute to political stabilization but also to better economic development. To make a contribution here would be a concrete offer as part of our development policy cooperation.

4. Cultural relations, in addition to political and economic relations should be fostered much more strongly than heretofore. Beyond the mere getting acquainted, cultural exchange first makes possible the solution of common problems. The cultural independence of the Arab world is not only being recognized by us in full; moreover, we are of the opinion that the return to one's own cultural identity--if it does not overshoot the mark--is a prerequisite for development. The development problems of the Arab area cannot be solved by taking over Western elements lock, stock and barrel. Nevertheless an increased exchange appears to make sense also under developmental aspects--not only in the technological field.

Possible fields would be for example:

--Scientific cooperation;

--Contacts of experts in all fields;

--Further training and development of journalists to overcome bias in the Arabia concept of the German public.

It would also be desirable for the Islamic world to devote its attention more than heretofore to Christian-occidental culture and tradition. As a result, common foundations could be developed which are of great importance in development cooperation between the European industrial states and the Islamic partner countries.

The lecture delivered some time ago in Bonn by Dr. Saber, the general director of the Organization for Education, Culture, and Sciences of the Arab League, includes many suggestions that could leave their mark on future cultural cooperation.

5. Development cooperation is not only a task of the state. The new Federal Government stresses private initiative--in the FRG as well as in the Third World. Therefore the role that can be played by private industry in the development efforts in the Arab countries must be increasingly examined. In this connection, the coming OPEC-DAC session in the summer of 1983 is also to call attention to cooperation with private banks.

The growing political and economic challenges to the countries of the region can be overcome only by joint efforts and in regional cooperation. Therefore we welcome and--as much as possible--promote all efforts to strengthen the unity of the Arab nation. We support everything that reduces intra-Arab conflicts, something that promotes non-alignment and makes possible a more active role of the Arab world within this group of states. This will counteract the danger that the Arab world will become a football in the East-West conflict and, in final analysis, will constitute a contribution to peace also in the rest of the world.

The challenges of the Arab world are for the most part ours, too. Political and economic reason therefore demand a joint search for solutions. Such solutions can only be found in a partnership association.

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## TRENDS IN PEACE MOVEMENT, DISCUSSIONS ASSESSED

Vienna OESTERREICHISCHE MILITAERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT in German No 4, 1983  
pp 293-296

[Article by Guenther Schmid: "Public Debate on Peace and Security"]

[Text] The so-called two-track NATO resolution of 12 December 1979 acted as a catalyst for turning peace and security policy into a major public issue above all in the FRG. Hardly any issue, it seems, has affected domestic and party political life in the FRG as much since the fifties or has added more of an emotional note to public and published opinion or led to a deeper split than the issue of the possible deployment of new American medium-range nuclear missiles on West German soil starting in late 1983.

But as important and decisive as the NATO resolution was for the subsequent, wide-ranging security policy debate, it cannot in and of itself serve as an explanation for the emergence and rapid growth of the many-faceted "peace movement."\* In retrospect, one may say that the stage had in many ways already been set in the seventies for the emergence of this "anti-missile movement."

Among the factors responsible for this are the following: fear of the future, economic crisis, the dissolution of traditional value systems and role models; the gap perceived by young people in particular between the promise of progress and socio-political realities; a perception of the declining capability of practical politics and of the political parties responsible for them to solve existing problems; the "gaps in experience and transparency" which characterize all phases of political life and/or the inability of the individual to play a decisive role in political life, a perception not limited to the alternative scene; the collapse of faith in the "can-do" aspect of progress and growth and in its place the potential for much anxiety; the subjective experience of an ever-growing threat to the natural environment, and the shock experienced by many of living in an era of political and military detente which was suddenly transformed into a time of crisis and tension (such as in the case of Afghanistan, Iran,

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\* Quotation marks are being used because we are dealing with a self-selected and therefore controversial designation which presumes to identify a known subject and thus is of little meaning in analytical terms.

Poland and rearmament). The sum total of these experiences has permitted a socio-political area of conflict to emerge which provided the incipient debate on peace and security policy with the necessary foundation. The rapidly growing "peace movement" was largely instrumental in giving an impetus to this public debate and has kept it going ever since.

Without a doubt, the NATO resolution of December 1979—both symbolically and practically—represented, at least until then, the high point of these growing "experiences of impotence" and "perceptions of being threatened." For the supporters of the "peace movement," it was and still is the almost archetypical proof for the fact that political decisions can hardly be influenced or clearly perceived (the buzzword being "foreign domination") and that the compulsions of arms policy and weapons technology have assumed a life of their own ("arms race") and, finally, that they are all jointly affected by existential decisions. That is why the resolution became their primary target, their protest issue and, for all intents and purposes a symbol of the physical threat facing them. This symbol then served as the peg on which to hang the widespread discontent about "political life." This may also explain why the lowest common denominator of the "peace movement's" efforts finds expression in the struggle to prevent and obstruct the realization of the two-track resolution by every conceivable means even though the movement itself, which is split into separate factions and groups, has no common strategy and though the divergent views on how to achieve the goals of working for peace are largely irreconcilable.

The concentration on this one common link which serves as the basis for a broad activist alliance and has thus far kept the movement loosely together explains much of the success of and the response to the "peace movement." To be sure, this success has thus far only been due to the fact that substantive differences have been set aside for largely tactical reasons.

Generally speaking, there are three basic positions which characterize the broad-based public debate about the NATO resolution which is viewed as controversial by all political and ideological camps:

- deployment of the new American weapons at any cost;
- deployment of the weapons only after Soviet-American control negotiations have failed;
- prevention of deployment of the new systems at all costs.

Basically, there are three substantive lines of argument confronting one another in this dispute:

/Traditionally/ oriented strategists and peace researchers generally opt for adhering to and improving upon existing NATO defense strategy of flexible response and Western security policies based on this concept. But those who might refer to themselves as "critical peace researchers" and their supporters disapprove of Western military strategy as well as the two-track resolution in its present form.

The institutional headquarters of the "critical peace researchers" may be said to be the Hesse Foundation for Peace and Conflict Research (HSFK) in Frankfurt which was established by the Hesse Land government in 1970 and is funded by it. Researchers from this institution have made some important contributions to the ongoing security policy debate. Most of the HSFK membership would probably characterize its relationship to the "peace movement" as one of "critical solidarity." The critics of the NATO two-track resolution propose that alternative security models be put to the test—ranging from the establishment of a nuclear-free zone and defensive military concepts all the way to unilateral disarmament.

The /middle-of-the-road/ position contends that there is no such thing as a perfect security strategy with or without military means that can be discerned in the foreseeable future. Those who hold to this view are in favor of altering Western defense strategy by small stages. They consider "modernization" a reasonable idea but not an urgent necessity in its projected form and in discussions about alternative models their position is to subject the different security policy goals to close scrutiny.

Over the past 3 years, the lively and partisan debate has concentrated in the main on the first two positions—in other words on the dispute between official security policy and the "peace movement." In part, this debate about peace and security policy has had a rather emotional tinge to it. The debate has had two results at least:

On the one hand, it succeeded in involving almost all segments of the population and the media. On the other hand, it succeeded in sensitizing the public to a greater extent than heretofore to the long-neglected issues of peace and security.

But the debate has also had another interesting result attested to by a large number of opinion polls. There is a divergence of opinion as between the media and the opinion leaders on the one hand and the public-at-large on the other. Despite the heated controversy about the NATO two-track resolution, a large majority of the population continues to believe firmly in a convincing defense capability and security in the Western alliance. Any renunciation of military defense is unlikely to attract a majority in the foreseeable future—at least as far as the FRG is concerned. Critics of official security policy contend that the ongoing security policy has changed a lot of people's minds. But the polls obviously do not seem to bear this out.



But looking back at the dispute and the course it has taken so far, could one say that the two camps have engaged in a genuine exchange of views? What exactly are the characteristics of the current debate on peace and security policy and are these very characteristics responsible for the difficulty of properly communicating the issues?

There is at least one striking aspect of the lively discussion which has been going on since 1980/81 that meets the eye:

On behalf of the "modernization" critics, public debate is being conducted by a handful of prominent multipliers and media spokesmen who are fully aware of their impact both in public and in the media. Among those who have, as it were, monopolized and channeled the debate are peace researcher Alfred Mechtersheimer who is called on by almost all the factions of the "peace movement;" Dieter S Lutz; Major General (retired) Gert Bastian; Petra Kelly, the former national chairman of the "Greens" and Erhard Eppler, a member of the SPD presidium.

In actual fact, however, the various spokesmen of the movement are almost always overworked because of the largely project-oriented nature of the "peace movement's" activities. As a result, they are virtually out of touch with one another and the movement itself is becoming more and more difficult to oversee. "Everybody does what he wants," is the way one "peace activist" resignedly put it—which is probably a good way of describing the situation. For another thing, it is hard to tell which groups and fractions the abovementioned spokesmen actually represent.

1. A number of high-level scientific and didactic contributions on the subject notwithstanding, the debate is more in the nature of a "religious war" with a lot of speculating, postulating and moralizing taking the place of genuine substantive argument. One's own position and/or one's own alternative concept on both sides of the fence is raised to the level of exclusivity and inerrancy. Clever public relations campaigns raise publications on peace and security issues to the level of "Bibles" and "Magna Chartas." Supporters and critics of traditional security policy lay claim to absolute truth—either on the basis of incontestable technocratic data or, conversely, of incontestable higher morality. "Government expertocracy" is disputed by a "counter expertocracy" or vice versa.

2. There are marked autistic elements to the controversy. To a large extent, it is characterized by uniform lines of argument and stereotyped reiteration of well-known positions. For some time now, almost all the conceivable evidence for and against the two-track resolution has been on the table; nothing new is being put forward. The opposing arguments are not compared with one another. One's own position is raised to the level of absolute truth and thus immunized against any and all criticism. Given such an autistic situation of "non-debate," the opposing viewpoint becomes no more than a bother of necessity. Both sides seem to think that their arguments are becoming more correct and, above all, more convincing through constant repetition (and, in part, through new packaging).

Panel discussions between the proponents of the opposing views take on the character of standardized rituals. Typecasting, it seems, prevents the experts of both sides from as much as taking note of their opponent's arguments and even less from taking a position on them. And if someone mentioned a divergent view in the footnotes to his own article, it would apparently amount to a departure from the one and only "truth." On the one hand, the debate is dominated by constantly recurring formulas justifying official security policy and on the other hand, the numerous "critical" assessments either do not take note of well-known counterarguments fully or do not take note of them at all. Opposing views are hardly ever incorporated in one's own analyses or are watered down in order to make refutation that much easier.

3. The man-in-the-street (and that includes the student) is in over his head as far as the current debate on peace and security policy is concerned. The complicated subject matter calls for detailed information which only a few of us possess and which at any rate is hard to come by. Even among those who at bottom are interested and committed, the complexity of the issues has caused uncertainty and a sense of helplessness. The average reader is confronted by a vast amount of conflicting data, figures and analytical information. More than 175 publishing houses have come out with over 600 books and there has been a veritable deluge of articles written since the early eighties in the FRG—all dealing with current aspects of peace and security policy. These are boom times for peace and strategy research—public and commercial interest in the research findings having increased by leaps and bounds. There is a hardly a publisher who does not have a "peace title" on his list.

The large number of quickies dealing with "modernization problems" tends to obscure the fact many of these publications contain totally different source material and data and thus confront the average reader with the almost impossible task of comparing and assessing the information. Weighty tomes virtually "kill" the average reader by swamping him with facts and footnotes and frighten him through their sheer bulk and jargon as well as their voluminous indexes and bibliographies. One fine example of this type is a compendium published in October 1981 by a popular science paperback house which contains 378 pages, 697 footnotes (some of which take up one-third of a page), 43 tables, 26 diagrams, a "selected" bibliography numbering more than 300 titles and a seven-page list of abbreviations.

The psychological consequences of this type of overkill are obvious: the information is repressed; the complex problems are reduced to seemingly "simple" solutions and the job of dealing with seeming absurdity and/or insanity is left to the bureaucrats and military men responsible for such matters—or in other words, to the so-called "experts" and "counter-experts."

Looking back on the 3-year debate and its primary aspects, any observer would have to reach a somewhat skeptical conclusion at this stage.

A debate worthy of the name; a truly comprehensive exchange of controversial proposals and concepts has as yet hardly occurred. At best, there has been a debate largely marked by polemics and in the main, the two sides have talked past each other. There are two "realities" which seem to have taken hold in the two opposing camps—in the "peace movement" and the individuals and groups which sympathize with it and the exponents of official security policy and those who support it. Communication takes place only among members of the same group—as information from inside the "peace movement" in particular strongly indicates. It is limited to those who belong to the same group and can be heard to speak the same language. Numerous statements and manifestos give proof of these self-centered and insular viewpoints adopted by many of those who protest against the "modernization resolution;" who long for a state of "primal innocence" and for "purity" in the interconnected real world of corrupt power politics. This far-reaching disengagement from the outer world—in the absence of a clear view of the possible consequences and risks of such a stand—appears to be symptomatic of the self-centeredness of many of the small groups inside the "peace movement."

The question that must therefore be asked is what the reasons are for this distortion of the debate about peace and security policy and whether they may have their origin in the subject matter itself.

#### The Peace and Security Policy Issue and Its Communicability

From a didactic point of view, there are several important reasons for the fact that political education has neglected and failed to work on the general subject of "international politics" and "security policy" in particular.

International politics seems to be a subject reserved for the attention of handful of insiders: diplomats, experts and military men scarcely known to the public—the "security expertocracy."

Secondly, this field is less structured because of its complexity, the wealth of material and its global approach. In other words, it is more limited than other political disciplines in terms of organizational and institutional parameters. In contrast to domestic politics which take place in a clearly defined environment (parliament, cabinet, associations, Bundeswehr and the like) the field of international politics is far less easily observed and experienced. Most people tend to view international complexities and conflict structures as well as diplomatic planning and decision-making processes as abstractions. Although they have been asked to any number of times, the schools, for example, pay far less attention to international affairs than to domestic politics in their curricula.

Thirdly, the average newspaper reader is left with the impression that international politics can scarcely be influenced and comprehended. As a rule, their effect on the individual may be said to be slight in concrete and immediate terms. Political polls have repeatedly shown that the average citizen is more interested and oriented toward domestic political life. His awareness of international issues is slight, largely restricted to topical events and somewhat diffuse due to the wealth of constantly new information. With very few exceptions (such as Ostpolitik and German policy in 1972), foreign policy issues have not played a decisive role in election campaigns. But the situation in the aftermath of the 1979 NATO two-track resolution has raised a great many foreign policy concerns for the first time since the fifties. In spite of its excessively polemical nature, the 1983 "missile election campaign" made that amply clear.

Against this background, there are four particular aspects of the "security policy" issue which need to be looked at.

1. First of all, many of those taking part in the ongoing debate seem to have forgotten that peace and security policy is a field which does not admit of ultimate truths and, as it were, eternal verities. No one knows what a nuclear war might be like; no nuclear warhead and no intercontinental missile has ever been fired under actual nuclear war conditions. A number of nuclear holocaust scenarios in book form notwithstanding, the actual physical, ecological and psychological consequences of nuclear (self-)annihilation exceed human powers of comprehension.
2. In the final analysis, the issues with which the security policy debate is concerned are existential issues—issues of life and survival in a world that appears to be getting less peaceful all the time. For the first time, man in the nuclear age has been given the tools with which to snuff out not only the generation now living but perhaps the human species as such. For many and particularly for young people such issues "of life and death" do not admit of debate, nor are they subject to majority decisions. The question is—that is how the argument frequently runs—exclusively one of weal and woe; of either-or. For the "peace movement" and the feeling of the growing threat to the "sustenance of life" which runs through it—a threat that arises from the constantly accelerating arms race—the question of which superpower actually represents more of a threat appears to be of secondary importance. The distinction between the power that armed first and the one that is catching up is no longer one of quality in the eyes of many but one of degree. The United States and the Soviet Union are both viewed as an equal (and thus interchangeable) threat.
3. One can debate for days on end about the obvious paradoxes and dilemmas of the nuclear age—such as the fact that there is no way back to a pre-nuclear idyl; that military armaments will continue to be a part of the security policy of all nations for the foreseeable future; that the maintenance of peace by military means may reduce but not remove the risk of

war; that nuclear deterrence, in the final analysis, helps prevent war by preparing for nuclear war and that there is no conceivable defense concept that fails to provide for military capability. All these issues may be debated but they cannot be discussed away or made to go away by rational means. Repression, diversion and escape from unpleasant reality frequently follow upon the insight that there are no "simple" explanations or best possible solutions for these fundamental questions but that there are only second-best answers to be had. The required understanding for the real issues involved is not gained either by repetition of traditional formulas justifying existing security policies or by poorly researched, if morally committed publicity campaigns on behalf of alternative security models. Some of the variants proposed of non-military preservation of peace do not amount to politically viable alternatives but to alternative politics as such.

4. What we have said here presents us with still another explanation for the autistic nature of the public debate. The debate about the "best way" to preserve peace in itself tempts one to pay no heed to political and military realities and to turn to broad-gauge arguments exclusively to make one's case. This type of escape into the upper reaches of an individual ethics while leaving the ethics of responsibility behind prevents one's own beliefs and concepts from being subjected to scrutiny based on realities and risks. The moral and ethical rejection of weapons and war, however, cannot in and of itself offer any concrete steps leading to the goal of disarmament. No doubt necessary but in themselves insufficient /statements of problems/ have repeatedly been mistaken over the past few years for /problem solutions/.

The goal of communicating complex issues of this kind must be to present the opposing positions and concepts as well as their limitations and possibilities as objectively as possible. Any alternative security model—this has not been sufficiently stressed in public debate thus far—must be put to the test of whether it provides a better deterrent than the existing defense strategy and whether it is capable of satisfying the security needs of the population in an appropriate manner. In other words, any debate on peace and security policy must start out with the question of whether there can actually be anything like an optimal, which is to say meaningful, effective defense strategy for the FRG, given its geostrategic situation—a strategy which reduces the risk of destruction to a minimum.

In the light of this ongoing debate, political education should try even harder than before to unravel the complexities of the security debate by providing an appropriate picture of the current situation as regards peace and security policy issues. Such an overview must consciously eschew the fascination emanating from "quick" solutions to overcome the security dilemma in the nuclear age—albeit on the basis of a more realistic appraisal.

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## SURVEY OF PEACE GROUPS, ACTIONS PLANNED FOR FALL

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 27 Jul 83 p 3

[Article by Karl-Heinz Krumm: "The Potential of Violence Has Not Increased-- Information Gathered by Security Authorities About 'Hot Fall'"]

[Text] A new provocative slogan is ghosting through the country: a "hot fall." Is it expected, are people afraid it will happen--or are they just talking themselves into it? At any rate, Federal and Land security authorities for weeks and months on end have been gathering all available information about the plans and intentions of groups large and small to voice their opposition to the stationing of Pershing II missiles. All this information is being channeled to a special task force at the Federal Ministry of the Interior.

As yet it is not possible, however--at least reliably--to make an accurate prognosis on the basis of all this information about the scope of militant actions, violence and terrorism. The reason, says the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution [BfV] in Cologne, is that "as yet, in the campaign against NATO counterarming, propagandists of a broadening of the movement are at odds with advocates of making it more extremist." It adds, however, that there are a number of "bloody" signs from the "unpredictable" scene.

According to BfV estimates, the peace movement at present can count on 1.5 to 3 million active supporters ready for protesting the stationing of the missiles. The most active and largest united force of this "petit bourgeois protest movement" (as it is called in a staff paper) is stated to be the DKP and its front organizations with about 100,000 members--3.5 percent of the peace movement--which at the preparatory organizational conferences have often made up more than 50 percent of the attendance, are tightly organized and have available "a great deal of money from the GDR."

With these persistently spread arguments, conservative politicians especially try to justify their charge that the peace movement is being penetrated and guided by communists. Because increasingly Social Democrats and trade unionists too are participating in the peace movement, some leading BfV people go so far as to talk of a cancellation of democratic consensus, of an "attack against our country's political culture."

Even this assertion, however, is hardly a reason for conjuring up a hot fall of unrest and violence, for the BfV too concedes that orthodox communists, being interested in broadening the protest base, exclusively advocate traditional nonviolent mass meetings which are also acceptable to democratic forces. One BfV man comments succinctly: "The communist ushers are telling the troublemakers to keep their mouths shut."

Official observers, however, do not have quite so easy a time assessing the advocates of "direct nonviolent resistance" and "civil disobedience" because, the chances are, these could only put up a limited defense against a going-it-alone of militant forces which do not want to settle for nonviolence. Yet, it is said that at the preparatory meetings the groups pleading for tougher forms of struggle so far have found themselves isolated.

Actually even experts have a hard time presenting a detailed overview of the independent and autonomous wing of the peace movement. There exists, for example, the Federation of Nonviolent Action Groups (FoeGA) with about 500 supporters in approximately 60 local groups, or, as a supraregional organization, the Federal Congress of Autonomous Peace Initiatives (BAF) with roughly 700 local initiatives and an estimated 20,000 supporters. All these groups advocate nonviolence but plead for civil disobedience and, as they put it, "local actions apt to create obstacles."

A variety of arguments and objectives are, however, definitely noticeable on this wing as well. For instance, the Goettingen Working Group Against Atomic Energy explicitly warned against raising nonviolence to the level of an ideology, saying that confrontation with the state was indispensable. And finally, there are many small groups of the "autonomous" and "anti-imperialists" which "want to smash the whole dirty system" and for that reason alone will not let themselves be pinned down to nonviolent resistance.

Despite the influence of orthodox communists on the one side and the variety of points of view on the other, the two wings of the peace movement are working together in light of the possible missile counterarming. According to the BfV people in Cologne, supporters guided by the Committee for Peace, Disarmament and Cooperation (KOFAP), however, were invariably in a clear majority at three nationwide "action conferences" which established a coordinating committee to attend i.a. to plans for a Week of Peace in October with numerous actions and events.

These majorities primarily dealt with the planned nationwide "week of action" from 15 to 22 October scheduled to begin everywhere with decentralized events and to end with three big "people's assemblies for peace" in Bonn, Hamburg and Stuttgart/Ulm. Interspersed are "days of resistance" with daily changing protagonists and emphases of protest. Peace camps, blockades of military installations, vigils of warning and hours of silence are emerging as the keys of the multilayered activities. In the weeks preceding, some peace marches of women, for instance from Dortmund to Brussels or from Berlin to Geneva, are scheduled.

But at the discussions about the planned protest actions too, according to the official observers, there were disputes between groups advocating a broadening of the popular base and the "autonomous ones" striving for making the movement more extreme by means of "actions and confrontations." Thus the participants in the Cologne action conference with a clear majority passed an appeal under the motto: "The time has come; say no. No new missiles in this country!" The Goettingen Working Group Against Atomic Energy, on the other hand, meanwhile is distributing an alternative appeal reading: "The time has come; resist. No war again ever!" It is hardly to be wondered at, though, that there are such differences in emphasis; after all, there are 26 organizations represented in the Bonn bureau of coordination of the peace movement.

As for the question concerning planned violence during the pending missile protest, however, the BfV and police so far have found it quite difficult to come up with an answer, though the capsule statements of some politicians lead one to suspect concrete knowledge. Sure, there are a number of "martial" deliberations, say the people in Cologne, pointing to numerous flyers and statements distributed so far.

Thus, they say, at a conference of "nonviolent action groups" in Frankfurt a statement was distributed recommending the blocking of trains, the occupying of churches, city halls or other buildings and a blockading of public telephones.

In Ulm, a paper circulated in early January read: "Our means are blockade and sabotage actions, with which we shut down missile stations and interrupt routes of supply." And the mentioned Goettingen Working Group announced that "our resistance may mean violating unjust laws and also eliminating concrete obstacles."

More tangible evidence of what is pending in the way of militant actions, it has actually been possible to gather so far only from announcements by the Committee Against Bomb Transports. This committee, started by the Bremen "War Against War" group and then reinforced by local "Ini gegen Muni" [Initiatives Against Arms] groups, can count on about 300 supporters judging by attendance at nationwide gatherings.

These groups, primarily from the area of the "autonomous" and "anti-imperialists," are advocating the disruption of transport of U.S. arms and munitions under the slogan "Observe, Greet, Block." According to Cologne BfV data, they already have a telephone network of information about arriving and departing supply ships, particularly in Nordenham. The planned actions, they say, are in a test phase at present, with railroad switches already having been blocked, cables having been thrown over overhead lines and Molotov cocktails having been placed on tracks in the past months.

Statements and appeals in fact point to serious actions. Thus a paper distributed in Bremen considers an all-day blocking of tracks, a Stuttgart group notes that "the confrontation with NATO will be no "picnic," and an



invitation by that committee to a nationwide gathering stated: "We--48 groups from 18 towns--in the course of this year want to achieve a blockade and obstacle actions along the entire route of transport."

The BfV estimates the number of persons ready for violent actions also against the possible stationing of missiles at about 1,500 to 2,000--an estimate which has been fairly constant for years. It is said, however, that these groups, large and small, are not necessarily the same as those emerging on the fringes of demonstrations as "rabble-rouser" or "rowdies." Thirdly, they say in Cologne, one has to reckon with attacks from the sector of terrorist groups, what with a letter by the Revolutionary Cells having taken credit for the attack on the U.S. military parade in Berlin as "part of the armed struggle against the stationing of missiles."

Many a concern notwithstanding, the evidence so far does not yet permit clear conclusions as to a "hot fall" in the Federal Republic. If only because it is difficult to estimate the structure and number of the militant groups and, moreover, according to the people in Cologne, as happened in Krefeld, "only 4 weeks' preparation is needed to react to a concrete result," loud Cassandra cries, let alone demands for tougher laws or new weapons for the security forces, cannot be justified at this time. As a confidential study of the Federal Ministry of the Interior states, "indications of concrete preparations for militant actions (for example, attempts to penetrate military installations and to destroy weapons or other kinds of equipment) do not exist so far."

Thus the only up-to-date evidence is that there are a number of groups in the peace movement which reject the "slouchy demos" planned by the democratic forces--with or without DKP influence--and recommend other forms of activity. The key words for this are "nonviolent resistance" and "civil disobedience." Some notes by politicians, well-known jurists and BfV personnel permit the conclusion that they worry more about these forms of action than about individual deeds of violence that may be in the offing. Evidence of the security authorities available to date in the end do not support the thesis that the potential of persons engaged in political violence has noticeably increased in connection with the pending stationing of U.S. missiles.

8790

CSO: 3620/415

## STUDENTS POLLED ON ATTITUDES TOWARD GDR

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 29 Jul 83 p 3

[Article by Brigitte Mohr: "Almost Half of the Students Take the View: The GDR Is a Foreign Country. Politics of Inner-German Relations in Education/The Task of the Ministers for Education and Culture/Infra-test Survey"]

[Text] Bonn, 28 July. The federal minister for inner-German relations, Windelen, recently sent a paper to the ministers for education and culture which should give them food for thought. The paper in question is a survey by Infra-test [a German public opinion research institute] yet ordered by the old administration: 1,500 young people in the FRG between the ages of 14 and 21 were questioned during the period from April to June 1981 about their knowledge of, and attitude toward, the GDR. Seventy-seven percent stated that they had too **little** or nothing at all in school about subjects dealing with the politics of inner-German relations; only one-fourth expressed the view: "Adequately treated". Remarkable is the fact that there were hardly any differences in this between students of the short course secondary school, the intermediate school, and the high school.

This certainly is a disgraceful result for the ministers for education and culture, who in 1978 had agreed to a detailed recommendation, "Treatment of the German Question in Instruction" (29 pages), but have hardly monitored its transformation into reality at the school level. At the same time it confirmed the concern which Windelen expressed to this newspaper: That the young generation of teachers meanwhile engaged in teaching, which no longer knows the other part of Germany from their own experience, cannot be so particular with the consideration of this recommendation, for want of their own knowledge, for want of interest, and for want of appropriate training and further education. In his first face-to-face discussion with the ministers for education and culture, in April, the federal minister reported, he, Windelen, called the attention of the ministers especially to the significance of the further education of teachers.

The Courageous Deed of 1978

On this occasion, Windelen had given the ministers for culture and education some more friendly and admonishing advice: Their decision of 1978, he had said, was a courageous political act, indeed, "the most important document in regard to the politics of inner-German relations since the Basic Law". He had

reminded them of the reawakening historical consciousness and of the fact that concepts such as nation, people, and fatherland "were kept back all too long" from the young generation. It remains undecided whether all of them liked to hear this.

What the young people themselves know and think about the national question, the ministers can now ascertain from this investigation. As for the knowledge: When asked how many inhabitants the GDR has, only 6 percent of the West German students (7 percent of the high school students) were able to give the correct answer: 17 million. Eleven percent (13 percent of the high school students) said: 40 million and more. In reply to the question: "Can you name several large cities in the GDR?", 67 percent of those who knew anything to begin with came up with East Berlin, 59 percent--Leipzig, and 50 percent--Dresden. Only 15 percent of the students of all school types (22 percent of the high school students), however, knew the names of more than 5 cities, 50 percent (51 percent of the high school students) could think of 3 to 5 names, and 27 percent managed to come up with 1 to 2 names. Eleven percent of the students (including 11 percent of the high school students) regarded Danzig and 2 percent--Breslau as a city in the GDR.

When questioned about the sources of their information, most of them named television (74 percent) and daily newspapers (62 percent). This result corresponds almost exactly to an Infas-Survey of 1979 with respect to the total population. Only 46 percent of the students held the view that the treatment of the GDR in their school instruction was of "great or average significance".

#### Discipline and Modesty

A great difference, by contrast, exists in the political interest of the total population and the young people. In an Infratest survey in May/June 1981, 44 percent of the total population over 18 years of age, but only 20 percent of the young people, described themselves as "very strongly interested or strongly interested" in the most recent representative survey. Male young people (with 27 percent) were considerably more interested in political questions than female young people (13 percent). The general political interest reflects rather closely the interest in the development of the GDR, which is being "followed with great attention" by 24 percent of the male and 13 percent of the female young people. In so doing, they are most interested in "living conditions", "possibilities for development", and "everyday life" of the inhabitants of the GDR.

A further finding of the investigation should occupy politicians involved with inner-German relations as well as politicians dealing with questions of education: To a far greater extent than adults, young people are inclined to accord the GDR the character of a foreign country. For 43 percent of those surveyed (but for only 25 percent of the total population), the GDR is a "foreign country", for 56 of the young people (but 70 percent of the adults)--"not a foreign country". This attitude changes instantaneously when the young people have been in the GDR twice or more often. Of this group, 71 percent voted "not a foreign country".

The advocates were further questioned about the conditions under which, in their view, reunification should take place. "Zero percent" wished for a "communist system, similar to the GDR", 32 percent--a "libertarian-democratic system, obligated to remain neutral, similar to Austria" and 67 percent--a "libertarian-democratic system in alliance with the Western world, similar to the FRG". Quite different were the replies to the second half of this double-tracked question: "Under what conditions would a reunification be most likely?" When addressed on the subject of what is politically realizable, only one-third of the young people believed in a reunification on the model of the FRG, 27 percent--in a reunification under communist signs, while 47 percent regarded the attainment of a neutral status as being most likely.

Although only 17 percent of the young people were once or more frequently in the GDR--predominantly, by the way, together with their parents--most of them have a rather decisive picture of the Germans "over there", a picture in which the GDR inhabitants in a good many respects come off better than the West Germans. Discipline, modesty, close family relationship, willingness to serve the community, and an idealistic turn of mind are named as the chief characteristics of the Germans in the GDR. Decisive characteristics of the citizens of the FRG, by contrast, are in the eyes of the young people "consumption-oriented, self-confident, overbearing, tolerant" (in the sequence named). The report concludes: "Seen as a whole, the image of the character of the GDR inhabitants in the mind of the young people surveyed has humanly valuable, one is inclined to say, rather 'conservative' features".

Nevertheless: In a comparison of the living conditions in the two German states, the FRG fares very well in the judgment of the young people. Among 21 possible choices, the GDR is rated as superior in only 2 points: "Helpfulness of people to one another" and "security of the place of work". By contrast, the young people recognize as the most valuable element of the quality of life in the FRG "the possibility to express one's opinion freely and to offer criticism".

#### Fears of the Unknown

That the attitude toward one's own state always undergoes a positive change after visiting the GDR is reported again and again by teachers and leaders of youth groups. At the same time, there is an increase in the feeling of relationship with the people in the other part of Germany. However, it is also evident--this is made clear by the investigation--that a solitary short visit in the GDR, as a rule, is not sufficient for this. During the first time the important thing is to "overcome fears of the unknown".

Even though there is a hitch with the knowledge imparted by the school and the education of teachers, one thing the decision of the ministers for education and culture of 1978 nevertheless seems to have brought about: Since that time there has been an increase in the interest in class trips to the GDR: In 1980 42 classes with 1,068 participants crossed the border, in 1981 already 88 classes with 2,059 participants, but in 1982 350 classes and 60 other youth groups with approximately 11,000 participants. On the basis of the applications at hand, people in the ministry for inner-German relations anticipate a far greater number for this year. The class trips are subsidized in part by this ministry, in part by the federal states, but not by all. Bavaria alone held back completely until a short while ago. Will this change after the trip of the Bavarian minister-president?

## PAPANDREOU CHARISMA SEEN WANING IN LIGHT OF PASOK-KKE RELATION

Athens | KATHIMERINI in Greek 7-8 Aug 83 p 4

/Article by Kh. Karanikas/

/Text/ An open confrontation between PASOK and KKE is opening, focused on the economy, and becoming more acute in the next month. The meetings of the PASOK Central Committee last weekend and the KKE Central Committee two days later aimed in effect at the preparation of their party machinery for the confrontation, while they paid only lip service to their opposition and attacks against the Right. The devaluation of the drachma with all its consequences gives new weapons to KKE, while it proves to the people that the government not only lacks an economic policy but it is also incapable of grasping the meaning of the measures it takes and of their impact on the country's economy.

The governing camp is very worried because of reports that following the government's loss of support, the appeal of Premier A. Papandreou is fading rapidly. Papandreou's charisma has lost much of its magnetism not only in the capital but in the countryside, with the result that they consider risky to base the entire party propaganda on this "weapon." Anyway, throughout the Greek history, especially the recent one, the charisma--doubtful as a strong weapon--alone was not sufficient to save a party from its downfall. The father of the present premier, Georgios Papandreou, who undoubtedly had more charisma than his son, and with his oratorical skill and deeply rooted respect for parliamentary democracy, lost many elections. In Greece the people get bored with charismatic leaders even when they are successful, something which reminds us of the survival of ancient ostracism.

The fact is that the political horizon is moving essentially and definitely for the first time since the war in our country. The traditional Left, today's KKE, separates its political practice and policy from PASOK--the party which expresses today the center left. Not only that but it is starting a struggle against it, accusing the present government that it cooperates with the political centers of the ruling class and the secret services, for its anti-communist campaign in a two-sided war. Moreover, according to the statement of KKE's Central Committee, the communist party accuses the government of promoting an artificial exacerbation of the political climate, thus giving its own interpretation in the appeal of the President of the Republic

C. Karamanlis to preserve a climate of democratic dialogue. Recognizing, however indirectly, the constructive role of the Chief of State in the country's political life, it gains the advantage to hit PASOK from the right and from the left. In any event, lately KKE avoids systematically references to the period the president of the republic was premier.

#### New Connections

On its part, the government leadership, seeing the shifts and moves of its followers, is searching for new organizational structures hoping it will be able to lean on them.

The meeting of the Central Committee last week is considered to be the opening chapter in this development aiming at the gradual weakening and the planned removal of all those who accept total submission to the Kastri group.

/Note: Kastri is Papandreou's residence. In any event, the right of the minority to disagree he discovered recently while some time ago he had expelled St. Panagoulis, Ar. Bouloukos, and G. Petsos for the same reasons.

Those at the top of the government are increasingly convinced that the shift of their voters is continuous and steady, gravitating toward the democrats and those who have been active in the struggle for democracy in our country. Their protests and complaints have influenced many even within the Central Committee and for this reason they are afraid that those who disagreed /at the CC meeting/ may be more than two--together with the other 12 who agreed with their views but did not want to go so far as to vote against the report of the Executive Bureau. Thus, side by side with the party organization of the governing party there is in reality another organizational relationship being set up and a channel which is controlled exclusively by Kastri.

This channel is being built around the various interests served by the state machinery with the advancement of persons loyal to the top of the government into key positions in the capital and in the provinces. It was charged at the Central Committee meeting, in fact, that the choice is not made from among the existing party cadres and according to the "fighting" record of each one, but on the basis of his ties and obedience to the Kastri group. Some members of this group quite cynically acknowledge that "if with this method the Right stayed in power for 50 years, why not us?" The opponents claim at this point that even collaborators of the dictatorship are being used against those who opposed the military but who now do not accept the castration of their will.

Some claim even more crudely that this was the meaning of the slogan "the Right has been thrown into the dustbin of history" used by the chairman of PASOK. It was thrown into the dustbin and it was replaced by the new PASOK state, which uses precisely the same methods to hold onto power. The main objective of these actions is to promote the interest of the trade groups through the farmer-industrial cooperatives, the "socializations", the "decentralization" and the like. All have as their basic criteria for

for selection the view that "we represent the majority" and therefore "we appoint whomever we like" as it happened with the Article 4. All these remind us of other periods between the two wars and of the efforts of the fascist states.

This is complemented with the views on limited sovereignty and the granting of the democratic rights drop by drop. But the exercise of the democratic rights is not like the consumption of some luxury item, nor its future acquisition, but an immediate and actual practice "here and now." From the exercise of this right no one can be exempted, not even the leader, especially the leader because the criticism in a democracy can be directed only against his person. This view is promoted actively by the government propaganda, while building the new channels to spread it in the wider strata. The problem, however, is that this new tactic can hardly offset the negative impact the Papandreou charisma begins to have now, accompanied by his absence from the Chamber of Deputies--a fact which particularly annoys the people.

#### The Clash

The contempt and distortion of the democratic institutions attempted by the government comes at a time when the economic crisis becomes deeper than ever before in the postwar period. To overcome the crisis, the government must use sincere and convincing language and prove that it respects the democratic process. Nothing like this is offered by the government leadership except for the totalitarian propaganda by the mass media and the removal of every person that could voice criticism.

On the other side, KKE was waiting precisely for this moment to get out of the corner in which "it was held by PASOK." The clash between the two parties will not come over the critical national issues on which the communist party has "trimmed its sails." KKE apparently, to judge from its statements, is planning to start the attack with the economic issues at the proper time, combining this with the defense of democratic institutions. In this way it will be able to escape its political isolation--always in the left but also tailing behind PASOK after the dictatorship--and to again join the democratic forces as this term has become known in the postwar period. It seems that KKE has heard the reports that in the traditional democratic areas the outflow from the government party is more intensive and more massive, even though most of the people stay at the crossroads. On the contrary, the outflow is much smaller in the traditionally Right areas.

#### Bankruptcy

Following the new devaluation of the drachma and the taxation of real estate, the bankruptcy of the economic policy is crystal clear. It proves that the government is incapable--and it is questionable whether it wants to--of grasping the dimensions of the economic crisis in our country. Actions ranging from the "purchase" of the obsolete ESSO refinery, which means a

subsidy to the company, to the marketing of the farm products and the small-to-medium-size businessmen show amateurism and partisanship. They also show a strange euphoria about the government course, euphoria which is not shared from below and especially by the parliamentary deputies who are the only ones who have contacts with the people. This euphoria is also accompanied by the absence of all coordination in the exercise of governmental power, especially in the economic sector. The only thing the non-parliamentary officials who are in charge of the economic sector can do is to talk to Kastro against the parliamentary ministers, to undermine their work and at the same time to call for their removal and their replacement by trusted persons.

The next month will arrive with the presentation of economic demands by all classes. Nothing indicates even the least preparation of the government leadership for the coming hard times. According to an economic minister "they sleep soundly up there." "But what does that mean?" he asks, as do many others, deputies and party cadres, without being able to give an answer. They fearfully wait for the new days, but also with great reservations for the plans of the Kastro group.

7520

CSO: 3521/404



## KAPSIS REPORTEDLY DIVESTED OF POWERS

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 2 Aug 83 p 1

/Article by Alexandros Velios/

/Text/ The internecine feud between Minister of Foreign Affairs T. Kharalambopoulos and Deputy Foreign Minister I. Kapsis ended with a devastating (and rather final) defeat of the deputy minister. A few days ago, a communication came to the Kapsis office, signed by A. Livanis, the director of the Premier's Political Office (on behalf of Papandreou) which took away from Kapsis any jurisdiction over personnel in the ministry. All such responsibilities now come under Kharalambopoulos exclusively.

This is a deadly blow for busy-body Kapsis who drew much of his power from the fact that almost all personnel transfers of diplomatic and administrative staff of the Foreign Ministry (not particularly on merit) came out of his office.

This is a wise decision of the premier's office (inspired--it is rumored--by the premier's diplomatic adviser, Khr. Mahairitsas) designed to balance the dark impressions (and reactions) the Kapsis policy had caused throughout the diplomatic service with understandable effects on the operations of the Foreign Ministry. In this sense, the "pruning" of the Kapsis powers is also a victory for the diplomatic staff.

Was this, we wonder, Kapsis' reward for the "nationally proud agreement he forced" on Bartholemew? The further question--raised by certain political observers--is whether the initialing of the agreement will result in Kapsis' disappearance from the political stage.

7520

CSO: 3521/408

## TURN TO EUROPE, WANING POLITICAL INFLUENCES VIEWED

## Europe: 'Last Resort' for Economy

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 14-15 Aug 83 p 1

[Excerpt] According to information coming from circles within the majority party, the drafting of a new policy was the subject of special discussions recently taking place at Kastri by a small number of government staff personnel. This new policy will be "Europe oriented" and will have two main goals: confrontation of the economic crisis and preparation by the government party for the upcoming Euro-elections. This effort, when once completed will have real effects on PASOK's political aspect, now appears to be absolutely necessary at once because "the margins for maneuver have been exhausted following the so many things that have been perpetrated in economic policy," as many of those close to the prime minister's economic circle believe. They maintain that there are now only two paths to take: borrowing from the European Monetary Fund or from the International Monetary Fund, while of the two the former is preferred. The new evaluations that are being considered at the government summit level will also lead to rearrangements in the "Kastri group" with the bypassing of the "Third World" proponents in which the two top economic ministers, namely Messrs Ger. Arsenis and D. Koulourianos, previously the elite of the "family circle," are included.

Moreover, the three top men of the executive office, Messrs Tsokhatzopoulos, G. Gennimatas and K. Laliotis, have for some time now been "bypassed." At one time, they had gone along together with the two economic ministers for the purpose of orienting the country toward the Third World.

Today, the prime ministers circle feels that the only solution lies in a European policy for immediate and practical reasons, given the point to which the Greek economy has been led.

Moreover, information from other sources are reaching Mr Papandreu's circle, and to the extent possible, the prime minister himself, to the effect that beginning next month the economic problems will perhaps become explosive and for that reason proper preparations must be made now to confront them.

However, political circles close to the government summit doubt the effectiveness of these preparations. All the measures being taken, even now in August with the summer break taking place, are assuming a firefighting endeavor and have no bearing on a planning for the course of the Greek economy. Criticized for this improvised planning are primarily the two economic ministers who had confirmed their tactics with their recent devaluation of the drachma and the imposition of new "taxes" on real estate.

From their standpoint, the two economic ministers now present themselves as being willing to collaborate with all. Characteristic of this is the fact that the day before yesterday they called in the deputy ministers and other ministers of production ministries and told them that each one must take initiatives and not to intrude into the jurisdictions of others. They too promised that they would hold to this policy.

These promises are considered as being suggested by Kastro and Mr Papandreu himself and as being aimed at blunting impressions that had been created by the confessed failure of the two ministers.

Without anything yet having been clarified since such decisions over jurisdictions are changed in accordance with the influence exerted by various groups in Kastro, the latest moves by Messrs Arsenis and Koulourianos are seen as aimed at smoothing out of relations between the government and representatives of the productive classes and various worker groups. According to information reaching the prime minister, the effect of the central committee decision is not at all positive, and it is for this reason that Mr Papandreu is turning toward the practice of a more conciliatory policy toward the concerned parties so as to confront the economic crisis.

#### The Party Organizations

Even the influence of the top men of the executive office in party organizations is now quite limited. Most organizations cannot control their members who agree with the people who come out against the economic policy. This is considered the most important reason for the downgrading of the partisans in Kastro and the endeavor being undertaken by the three to get close to and become acceptable to the prime minister's family circle. These endeavors, however, are not always successful and they are therefore perceptibly presented as having been displaced in the shaping of decisions made by the top government echelons.

Indeed, according to published reports, the prime minister's family circle predominates in economic matters, a circle that now appears to be pro-European. Also, it is trying to cast all responsibility on the two economic ministers despite the fact that the family circle had imposed them on the government. Moreover, almost all decisions are being made after a consonant agreement of the prime minister. Nevertheless, this attempt at "disengagement" by Mr Papandreu is doubted by many who are seeing with fear a continual fading away of the prime minister's personal influence among the people. Quite a few deputies and party officials both in Athens and in the provinces are pointing out that "Andreas' personal intervention no longer suffices."

This change in the government's political course is also necessary for confronting the Euro-elections next May. Preparations must begin now so that the government party's new political aspect "might go over on the people."

#### Papandreou Isolation

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 14-15 Aug 83 p 4 :

/Article by Khristos Karanikas/

/Excerpts/ The circle of associates with whom Prime Minister Papandreou is coming in contact is shrinking, while many in the government party are becoming more and more concerned over the measures being taken by the government to downgrade parliamentarianism. It has now become clear in Kastri, late, of course, as is the case in many other issues because of the unhurried attitude prevailing in Mr Papandreou's circle, that the tough --and probably decisive-- battle over economic issues will begin next month.

#### Unprepared for the Economic Battle

With regard to economic matters, the government appears to be almost completely unprepared and gives the impression of having given up. Quite a few people in the majority party are asking, "Is it really interested in economic issues?"

As the end of August is approaching, there is more and more information coming out about an impending storm in the closed stronghold of Kastri, while some are daring to come out and tell the truth to the leader. As a member of the majority party characteristically said, it appears that in the difficult days to come and in the face of the impending danger, the closed Kastri circle is breaking up "into its component parts." Therefore, the two economic ministers, whom very few --if not none at all-- now support, are considered the first and directly responsible. And since they have no other political strength they now seem to have become shooting stars.

The essence of the problem for most in the majority party, both parliamentarians and party members, is the fact that the government "is going barefoot through the brambles" and is completely unprepared for confronting the vast economic problems that will crop up beginning next month.

A few explain this inaction, this nirvana, to the complete ignorance of the top economic ministers as to how Greek society and economy are reacting.

To the nirvana of the economic ministers is added the unchecked actions by the Kastri group in promoting its own people throughout the entire state mechanism. Entrenched around the leader, the Kastri group is discarding a few but "is strengthened" even more by tightening relations with the remainder.

The fact that Mr Papandreou is being isolated to have contact with fewer and fewer people is causing the most concern among parliamentarians and party members. All of them see that with this isolation their leader is losing a great part of his political sensitivity.

They believe that as the leader's charisma fades and disappears, what become more than ever necessary is the intensification of political sensitivity to compensate for the loss and to permit the party to maintain its initiative in actions on the stage.

But this does not appear to be happening today in the majority party, at least as explained by moves made by the government and by Mr Papandreou's "inquiries" to his people.

Most in the majority party believe that so long as things are going badly the convening of another congress following the latest meeting of the central committee is to be ruled out. Criticism voiced has revealed the depth to which discontent within the party has progressed and has also shown that the margins for the leadership's counteracting are limited.

This is the way that the indefiniteness of the date for the convening of the party congress is explained, together with the avoidance of any form of binding action on other issues, with the exception of the appeal for mobilization against trade union demands, something that is considered rather doubtful.

The most probable is that the prime minister will delay his party congress since he cannot eliminate the dissenters.

5671

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## PASOK'S FUTURE POLITICAL COURSE QUESTIONED

Athens | KATHIMERINI in Greek 7-8 Aug 83 pp 1-2

/Article by Rikhardos Someritis/

/Text/ Paris--How stable is PASOK? To judge from the interest shown by diplomats and observers in the Papandreou movement and in its likely development, the issue must be getting more and more timely. The issue is not raised only by the West. It also concerns the East and the neutrals. They all relate it to the effects of any change in PASOK and the likely developments of the Greek foreign policy orientation.

The new impetus for the various speculations came from the announcement of the bases agreement. Regardless of interpretation and conflicting views, one thing is certain, namely, under this agreement the bases will remain in Greece until 1990, while their ultimate fate will be determined in July 1988 if the government at that time will terminate--or not terminate as the Americans logically add--the agreement.

It is logical for the Americans and most Europeans (who want to preserve Greece allied ties and the bases) to ponder the problem of PASOK and to try to forecast the possible developments. There is certainty today that until then, if not earlier, Washington will have found other solutions which will avert a Greek rejection or a Greek opposition which would place the American strategy in a difficult position.

Already the Americans could easily transfer their bases elsewhere but at great cost. Their insistence during the negotiations did not reflect merely defusing concerns of military character. Their negotiating insistence for an agreement had a political objective, too--which some people regarded as having priority: To preserve through the bases Greece's relations with the overall Western defense and Western orientations, that is, the consolidation of Greece's stay in the Western camp even with "peculiarities"--in the Romanian model of the relation with Moscow (theoretically there are no foreign bases in Romania). This tie is also of interest for tomorrow.

In these speculations, the Europeans add Greece's future tie to the European Community.

Of course, if PASOK should lose the next election (but few foresee such a loss for the time being, possibly because the New Democracy has not moved with the renewal many expected) the situation would not change with regard to NATO, the EEC or with regard to the bases.

If there was a victory for PASOK as it is today (that is, a movement in which the personal role of its leader Andreas Papandreou is decisive, without possibilities for democratic disagreement) the prospects for new directions in foreign policy would be very limited.

But will PASOK develop in this direction? Certain observers believe the preservation of the present configuration depends on many factors.

The first relates to the charismatic leader of PASOK and his decisions.

The second is the presidential election: Will the present balance continue, which allowed many developments (including the smooth functioning of the constitution) and which also averted many things as is believed?

The third is the development within PASOK: For how long will the movement continue to tolerate the autocratic spirit and for how long will the cadres have silence as the only alternative to a breakup?

The fourth is the clientele of PASOK: Will the movement be led to an alliance with KKE and the other democratic forces or will it become more conservative?

Many express the fear that the economic crisis and the constantly increasing unemployment will push farther to the left a considerable segment of mainly young people who supported PASOK in the 1981 election, with consequences on PASOK's international orientations as well.

Since there is no dialogue within PASOK--at least in public--no one (not even its followers) can weigh trends (which exist) and forces, while all course changes take place without processing and persuasive analyses. Even outside Greece it has now been recognized by all that the internal life of the movement consists of palace conspiracies and conflicts of personal interests.

Thus, Papandreou's omnipotence has a double contradictory consequence: It is a factor of stability today and a factor of instability tomorrow. This was said by a Western socialist commenting on reports about a possible convention of the movement's first congress. He expressed doubts as to whether it will be a true congress.

In any event, it will open the way to the Socialist International, as expected by many who would like to see PASOK tied to the international democratic movement even for educational reasons.

Indeed the possible petition to join the international will be regarded--many note this, correctly--as one of the most indicative steps in PASOK's maturity and westernization.

## PASOK PERCEIVED CULTIVATING TOTALITARIAN POLICIES

Athens | KATHIMERINI in Greek 7-8 Aug 83 p 9

[Editorial]

[Text] It took 50 years from the Constitution of 1924 to the new Constitution of 1977 to claim that the regime which came out of the October Revolution is no longer the dictatorship of the proletariat but the power of all the people in "the purest form of democracy." PASOK succeeded in only ...21 months to move from the regime of the "class struggle" and of the "oligarchic governments" to the government of all the people, supported by all the people!

It is of secondary importance, of course, that at the very moment the claims for these historic changes in our country are being presented, it is also declared that the syndicalist struggles are class struggles. This means we still have antagonistic groups in the population. Today's government, therefore, cannot be the representative of opposing forces, and its policy cannot be a policy that serves the interests of all the...opponents! In spite of all this, the decision of the 10th session of the PASOK Central Committee published yesterday in the press, insists that one of the two most powerful weapons PASOK has to continue its course is...the support and cooperation of the people in the work of PASOK!

No further proof is needed for the totalitarian mentality of the present government and of the organization it controls than this claim that it has "united" all the people behind the cloudy "visions" of a political "movement" that has been unable to acquire the clear and binding "line" of a political party. No more proof is necessary because the claim that there are no more political and ideological currents among the people who disagree with the government's objectives means, in effect, that the people are denied the right to remove the present government and give the mandate to another political camp to exercise power!

No doubt it is possible some of the decisions of the present government do contribute to the improvement and modernization of certain sectors of our social and economic life, which are in bad shape. In no way, however, can the contribution of positive services create a claim for a permanent hold of governmental power. In no way can it be translated into a claim that /the government/ has a priori the "national approval" to change the way our social and economic system functions, and to move us into other systems.



If the Papandreou-Koutsogiorgas government insists that the popular support for its work stems from the desire of the Greeks to change the conditions of their life, all they have to do is hold a referendum with a very simple question: Are you against the system of private ownership and private initiative? If the answer is yes then, and only then, can they continue their arbitrary actions for the "third road" socialism.

And something else no less important. Why did the authors of the Central Committee resolution fail to speak about the specific achievements of this government of "Change" during its 22 months in power? Why this rich oratory in praise of "future developments"? Didn't they find anything worthwhile from what is already done to "wrap" it in similar praise? Why didn't they relate the rape of the syndicalist movement to the implementation of the socialist change? Why did they keep silent about the crash of our economy, which is not justified by any foreign contingency, to this extent and in this form? Why did they say nothing about the public investments which will replace private enterprise in an autonomous and unassailable development? Why did they not express the satisfaction of the government and the "movement" for the developments in higher education? Why does the "resolution" from beginning to end contain promises for the future and not arguments about the present?

PASOK would betray the reason for its existence if it risked the contribution of its propaganda to the "grand objective" which is its stay in power by every means, by referring to governmental actions which raise questions about the usefulness of the country's government by the forces of Papandreou-Koutsogiorgas.

The organization of the movement must be waiting to remove everyone who does not agree with PASOK's totalitarianism, from the state machinery, the local self-government, the trade unions, and the cooperatives. The government--with the movement as its conscience--must legitimize by law this "purge". And the propaganda must distort the truth, to feed with visions the "sovereign" people to facilitate the work of the other two "action fronts!"

If the PASOK leadership dared to speak openly about its allies it would not talk about the people but about the fear felt these days by the working people lest PASOK does something that will increase the threat against the people's income, and the uncertainty about the future of their children! When this fear is overcome, then Papandreou and his government will have lost their major and only ally! And they will go back to where they came from: to total oblivion!

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CSO: 3521/404

POLITICAL

GREECE

## PASOK ACCUSED OF POLITICAL, TELEPHONE SURVEILLANCE

Alleged PASOK "Praetorians" in KYP

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 27 Jul 83 p 1

/Excerpt/ It is estimated that approximately 300 PASOK "Praetorians" have been hired recently mainly in the Central Intelligence Service (KYP), which is under the jurisdiction of the Minister to the Premier Menios Koutsogiorgas. These individuals have manned the "Group R-0" which has the mission of keeping the New Democracy Party under surveillance--according to data gathered by ND. These data will soon be made public.

ND's spokesmen said yesterday that the revelation of these data, which prove the activities of the parasitical group R-0 will cause an earthquake. They added that the names of those in charge and also of the actual operatives are known to the ND.

According to reports from ND sources, the group R-0 is under the command of an Army major and a wing commander of the Air Force, who are controlled by the "directorate" of PASOK's Executive Bureau. According to other reports which because of their nature could not be verified--as the ones above--an important role in the group is played by relatives of Youth Minister K. Laliotis (known in the KYP with the alias "Koudounas") and an Air Force colonel with a police lieutenant, a Navy commander and a ...sailor.

The Group was given a small but advanced computer which registers all information about telephone contacts, movements and letters of those under surveillance (even their preferences for night clubs!). Among those under surveillance are former ND ministers, deputies, businessmen, newsmen in opposition newspapers and others.

Government Denial

Athens TA NEA in Greek 28 Jul 83 p 14

/Text/ KYP does not tail citizens and does not tap phones but occupies itself "only with national issues." This was stated yesterday by Minister of the Premier Menios Koutsogiorgas responding to rightist newspaper reports claiming that KYP recently hired "300 PASOK Praetorians" who "keep under

surveillance and keep files on ND cadres." Koutsogiorgas called the reports "police novels" adding that "these reports apply to the methods of the past."

In addition, government spokesman D. Maroudas, referring to allegations by Averof and ND that there is surveillance of those who visit the ND offices at the Chamber of Deputies, said that nobody is policed and advised the ND to search to find who knew the lists with the names of those who were visiting the party offices. The M. Koutsogiorgas statement follows:

"No Greek citizen is under surveillance by the KYP, no telephone is being tapped. KYP now occupies itself only with national issues. All these reports apply to methods of the past. In KYP there is no other 'special service' and very few persons have been hired, only technicians. The reports about 'a major and wing commander under the control of a directorate, etc.,' are like a police novel."

Replying to questions by newsmen, Maroudas said that hiring personnel by KYP would not have been illegal. Instead it would have been necessary but simply it did not happen.

With regard to the methods of the past, mentioned by Koutsogiorgas, Maroudas said that those methods "started at a very distant past."

#### 'Telephone Taps' on Military

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 2 Aug 83 p 1

/Text/ According to exclusive "M" reports which because of their nature could not be officially verified, senior and general officers discovered in the last 48 hours telephone tapping devices and reported this to their superiors.

In two of the six--reported--cases, an Air Force general officer and a major general of the Army, who were away on vacation, discovered after their return home that "unknown persons" had tapped their telephones with very advanced devices (which allows the recording of conversations from a distance of up to 2,000 meters).

It was not possible to find out whether this is part of a wider plan for the surveillance of officers by a certain agency, and whether it is related to ND reports about telephone tapings.

One of the officers who found the device said that those who "do these things kill two birds with one stone. They listen in, and if the device is discovered they terrorize the owner of the telephone set, who usually avoids reporting the incident." The same general officer believes the tapping of telephones belonging to other officers must have taken place on a large scale.

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CS0: 3521/408

## 'CHANGE' SEEN NOT SOLELY PASOK'S PRESERVE

Athens 1 AVGI in Greek 3 Aug 83 p 5

/Text/ We will not focus on partial points in the report of the PASOK chairman at the recent session of the Central Committee, and which points contain certain sound analyses. What we wish to discuss is the overall thrust of the report. This thrust, we believe, will be reflected in the context of the Political Decision which has not been published yet.

This is the familiar thesis that PASOK is the "only alternative," a thesis which reflects the logic that the Change belongs to only one party. This is a logic which feeds the hegemonism and the partisan arrogance and which does not permit a disengagement from the old fashioned electioneering in which the major concern for a party is how to secure clear parliamentary majorities and not how, together with its strengthening, to contribute as a party to the mobilization of the widest possible political and social forces in the cause of Change.

In this sense, the report of the PASOK leadership is an invitation for its electoral support on the basis of a blind confrontation with the party of the New Democracy, which will intensify as the four-year term comes to an end. But in this way, neither the danger of a "comeback" of the Right and even more so of the rightist policy can be prevented. And of course, in this way, it is not possible to achieve the political conditions for the necessary popular cooperation in dealing with the difficult problems of today and with the deep changes in the direction of socialism, which the country needs.

The KKE-Interior, which believes in the significance of support by the progressive political and social forces to promote the change out of its present stagnation and impasse, will intensify its struggle in the direction of common action, showing clearly its political profile and political line. This condition, to promote the ideas of renewal among the workers and to gain ground for the different view called for by the conscious convergence of all the democratic forces of Change.

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CSO: 3521/408

## ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 3, 4 Aug 83

[Article in two installments by Kees van der Malen: "Five Intelligence Services in the Netherlands" and "Military Intelligence Services Provoke Questions"]

[3 Aug 83 p 3]

[Text] Defense Minister De Ruiter last week announced a thoroughgoing investigation of any possible involvement of the former Dutch military mission in Suriname in the coup d'etat of February 1980. Any such role would have been analyzed by an intelligence service. Press reports concerning this investigation in the "Valk affair" have brought the Dutch intelligence services to the attention of the public again. This article offers an overview of the various intelligence services. Tomorrow's edition will contain the second installment and it will deal with the Parliament's supervision of this operation.

The Hague, 3 August--An apparently new secret intelligence service surfaced in the news last week. Published reports on the "Valk affair" in the weekly VRIJ NEDERLAND revealed a study by the Counter Intelligence Service, also called the CID.

There is no CID in today's Dutch relations. There was once a Central Intelligence Service that was chartered in London by the [exile] government. This was replaced after the war by the Domestic Security Service (BVD). Insiders claim that the study of the "Valk affair" was done by the army's military intelligence service.

The Netherlands has five intelligence services. In addition to the widely known Domestic Security Service, there are the military intelligence services of the three military branches and the Intelligence Service Abroad (IDB).

Though these intelligence services are naturally shrouded in mystery, such formal aspects as organization and methods have been public knowledge for a

decade, albeit in no great detail. The regulations established by royal decree governing the intelligence and security services have been a matter of public record since 1972. For a long time this was not the case. The original royal decree of 1949 establishing the regulations for the intelligence and security services remained secret until the early seventies.

Despite pressure from Parliament and public opinion, the government refused to make these regulations public. This policy was based on the view that the government should not admit publicly that the Netherlands possessed a counter espionage organization.

#### The British Model

The Dutch intelligence services were set up on the British model. They limit themselves to gathering information and following activities of citizens and groups that might jeopardize the security of the state or the democratic system of law and then the military organization.

In contrast to, say, the Danish, French, Swedish or East European services, the Dutch intelligence services have no authority to conduct investigations. Agents mainly collect information and shadow suspects if necessary, but have no authority to make arrests. Evidence must be routed to the public prosecutor, whereupon the police make the investigation and arrest.

The five Dutch intelligence services are subject to the laws of parliamentary democracy and perform their work in accordance with Dutch statutory law and under the supervision of the appropriate minister, whom the Parliament can call for an accounting at any time.

The minister of Domestic Affairs is responsible for the Democratic Security Service. The defense minister is responsible for the three military intelligence services (those of the army, navy and air force), and the prime minister is over the Intelligence Service Abroad.

In the early 1970's, the responsibility for the Intelligence Service Abroad was transferred to Defense for a short time. This change--rescinded in 1972--was due to turf squabbles between the intelligence services at Defense on the one hand and the Intelligence Service Abroad on the other.

The military intelligence services accordingly gather information of military significance exclusively, such as innovations in weapon systems and the extent of military hardware.

The Intelligence Service Abroad gathers information concerning political trends abroad and in part also follows military developments. A working boundary has been drawn and activities abroad are conducted exclusively by the Intelligence Service Abroad. The military intelligence are to refrain from foreign operations.

The transfer of the Intelligence Service Abroad (at that time known as the Foreign Intelligence Service or BID) was short-lived, partly because it was

the judgment of the Parliament that the operation of the Intelligence Service Abroad in the Defense Ministry gave this service too much of a military character, and in 1972 it was returned to the prime minister, where it has remained since.

#### Cooperation

The five intelligence services have been mandated to work jointly, especially by exchanging information. An official answering directly to the prime minister is in charge of coordinating the activities.

The ex-naval officer, retired Vice-Admiral J. E. Kruimink, has been acting as coordinator of the intelligence and security services since 1 January 1973. He formerly headed the naval intelligence service.

The chiefs of the various intelligence services regularly consult together under the direction of the coordinator in what is officially called the Committee of Joint Dutch Intelligence Services.

The general policy for the intelligence and security services is determined by a ministerial commission composed of the ministers of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Domestic Affairs and Defense along with the prime minister.

The regulations pertaining to the intelligence and security services contain a provision that is striking in light of the developments in the "Valk affair." After denials by successive ministers of Foreign Affairs concerning Dutch involvement in the coup in Suriname and the further investigation by Minister De Ruiter occasioned by commentary about one of his security services, the following regulation may yet have a bearing on the matter: Each minister who has primary responsibility for an intelligence service should inform his fellow ministers directly about questions of importance (anything that might be important).

[4 Aug 83 p 3]

[Text] The "Valk affair" concerning the possible involvement of the former Dutch military mission in Suriname in the coup of February 1980 has again placed the activity of the intelligence services in the limelight. Chamber members have asked whether Defense Minister De Ruiter was himself aware of the investigation allegedly conducted by one of his military intelligence services in this affair. What intelligence services exist in the Netherlands, and what is Parliament's role? The lead article yesterday surveyed the organization. Today's article examines Parliament's oversight of the intelligence operation.

The Hague, 4 August--In its supervision of the intelligence services, the Parliament has never given major attention to the military services. Interest was always strongly concentrated on activities of the Domestic Security Service (BVD), the most extensive and important of the intelligence services.

"Yes, that is true. The military intelligence services have come up for discussion only in passing during the past several years," admits Den Uyl, chairman of the Chamber's standing Committee on Intelligence and Security Services and leader of the Labor Party.

The investigation of the military intelligence service of the army in the "Valk affair" is being seized upon by Den Uyl to understand better the relations between the intelligence services and the military and political leaders in the Defense Ministry.

In this connection, several questions arise. Were De Ruiter and the other defense ministers since 1980 informed of the possibly damaging report on the role of the military mission in Suriname? If the ministers were not informed, how did it happen that they, the ones bearing political responsibility for it, could remain unaware of it? And how is the investigation of the intelligence service to be reconciled with earlier declarations of successive ministers that no regularities occurred at the mission in Suriname?

Says Den Uyl: "The course of affairs seems to me to justify calling the defense minister for an exhaustive account of the operation of the military intelligence services."

#### Secrecy

The supervision exercised by Parliament over the work of the intelligence services has its paradoxes. Intelligence services require a large measure of secrecy in order to function adequately, whereas parliamentary oversight is difficult to conduct in the absence of openness.

The Chamber has been involved with the intelligence services more or less systematically since 1952. A permanent committee of the Chamber, comprised solely of the chairs of the major parties (presently those of the PvdA [Labor Party], CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal], VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] and D'66 [Democrats '66], confers regularly and in complete confidence with the ministers responsible for the various intelligence services.

This policy of secrecy has remained unchanged for over 30 years without any serious violation, but the Chamber's supervision has increased.

During the early years--also the period of the cold war--the work of the Chamber committee took place in an atmosphere of total mystery. Views changed in the Parliament, resulting in the committee reports being made public since 1967.



Handle

These reports give a broad survey of the matters discussed by the committee and serve more and more as a handle for the Parliament in its discussions concerning the operation and activities of the intelligence services.

The Second Chamber has exerted pressure over the years to provide a more solid basis for its oversight of the intelligence services. After the formal missions and methods of the intelligence services had been made public in 1972--the original regulations dating from 1949 had always been classified--the Chamber asked for a legal basis through the Roethof Bill in 1975.

The administration approved this a year later and in 1981 drew up legislation containing regulations governing the use of information and providing for an independent grievance committee for citizens. This legislative proposal is widely perceived as a strengthening of democratic supervision of the intelligence services. The Second and First Chambers have yet to discuss the proposal.

Although the Chamber's supervision is increasing, the average Chamber member still has only limited information concerning the intelligence services. CDA Chamber member Faber, who has studied specific intelligence matters for several months, says: "You can pick up things here and there sometimes alright, but it's not long before you run up against secrecy. It's awfully hard for a Chamber member to get to the bottom of anything because everything is protected by the confidentiality of the consultations with the party chairpersons."

Show

As chair of the Chamber Committee on Intelligence Services, PvdA Chairman Den Uyl defends this total confidentiality. "The question is," according to Den Uyl, "does the Chamber want to be effective or does it want to put on a show? I prefer effectiveness, and that requires confidentiality in this field."

He claims that his experience as chair of the Chamber committee for various terms has taught him that it is often difficult to get ministers to divulge information. He thinks that they would refuse altogether if the character of the committee were changed.

Den Uyl also believes that the Chamber must continue to take a cautious attitude in exercising oversight of the intelligence services and not take it upon itself to play a role in determining what the intelligence services are to observe.

Cautious

"In my judgment," Den Uyl continued, "this is preeminently a policy area where the Chamber must be vigilant in taking some responsibility for the policy. It is the function of the Chamber committee to be alert to faults and abuse of authority and to assure that the principles that apply are observed." Den

Uyl does not deny that oversight often amounts to no more than checking into incidents. "Yes, there is some truth to that," he said.

It is a fact, however, that the activities of the Dutch intelligence services are confined to, as a former minister expresses it, "the minimum that is necessary." Also, not much secrecy is possible in an open society like that of the Netherlands.

The former minister explained: 99.9 percent of the matters looked into by the intelligence services don't amount to anything. It's very rare that anything really serious comes up."

The former minister warns against overestimating the influence of the intelligence services: "Much of the work very simply involves keeping up with everything that goes on in society, and that's often no more than what's in the newspaper. As a matter of fact, the word intelligence service is quite a big word for what goes on in the military intelligence services."

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CSO: 3614/129

## POLL MEASURES VOTERS' SECOND-CHOICE PARTY PREFERENCE

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 20 Jul 83 p 7

[Article by Guri Hjeltne: "SV is the second-choice for Labor voters"]

[Text] Nothing is the same. Just under a million voters are "unstable" as the municipal elections of the autumn approach. Whom do they waver between, those who at least will not remain home?

An overview published by ARBEIDERBLADET shows dramatic differences in people's second-choice; that is, the party they view as next best.

Most striking: the Progress Party's support, as a strong rival of both the Labor Party and the conservatives.

The tables we have published are from Henry Valen's book "Elections and Politics" and from the Central Statistical Bureau's survey of the 1981 parliamentary elections. From the latter source come the most up-to-date 1981 figures.

The overviews of second-choices of Labor (A), Conservative (H), Christian People's Party (KRF), and Center Party (S) voters shows entirely the situation we face prior to the municipal elections September 12th.

These are the Norwegian voters preferences, which party they find next-best. All opinion polls after 1981 show a remarkable stability.

#### The Force of the Wave

The conservative wave which appeared at the parliamentary elections in 1981 had a powerful new ingredient--Carl I. Hagen's Progress Party. This is still the force of the wave; this percentage will most probably increase in the autumn.

As an alternative to the Labor Party, the Progress Party increased from two to eight percent between 1979 and 1981. For the conservatives the number more than doubled from 14 to 34 percent.

A common problem for both parties is how can they in each their own way get hold of the Hagen handle?

The Progress Party first became an alternative for some of the Christian People's Party voters in 1981. What are the voters evaluation of him in 1983? Among the Center Party's voters this smooth, urbane politician has up to now won little sympathy, and the 1983 elections will show whether there has been any change.

There is no doubt: Hagen is the election's joker. How large a chunk will the Progress Party take? How many voters will give them their vote and no longer merely view the party as the best alternative?

#### Course Unknown

The tables are a reminder and a catalogue of the party system which was totally changed in 1972-73 and which has an unknown destiny.

On the one side stand the voters of 1965-69, on the other side the voters of the 1970s and, if we may put it this way, on the third side will be the voters of the 1980s.

The liberals were a shock absorber between the Conservatives and the Labor Party until 1972 when the party split. Before that time the two parties were as different as water and fire. Since then, the Conservatives as the second choice of Labor voters has continuously become more striking. Over a quarter, 26 percent, of Labor voters regard the Conservatives as second choice among parties. And reverse--slightly under a quarter, 23 percent, of Conservative voters regard Labor as number two.

The old political line and political loyalties are broken, and voters find similarities, in the case of the Labor and Conservative parties, for example in moral, religious and environmental policies.

The fact that a third of Labor's voters now see the Socialist Left Party (SV) as the next best party is due to the loss of moderates within Labor to the Conservatives, for example. The left wing thereby dominates the picture and more voters put SV in second place.

The middle-of-the-road parties are significantly weakened, perhaps with the exception of the Center Party as an alternative to the Labor Party.

#### Ambiguous Love

The developments within the conservative voting bloc is also worthy of study. In 1965 more than half regarded the Liberals (V) as the main alternative and feelings towards the Socialists were very cool. In 1969 it became possible to detect a change in attitudes towards the other non-socialist coalition parties; sympathy for the Liberals fell and rose for the Center Party. Then the EC [European Communities] campaign came. The Center Party as second-love disappeared while the Labor Party gained significantly in popularity among conservative voters. The enthusiasm for Labor fell in 1973 again, but the conservative voters have since then regarded the Labor Party as the next best party to a great extent.

The tables provide interesting study with regard to the new non-socialist government. The conservative voters prefer as usual the Center Party, a quarter of them, while the Christian People's Party's popularity among conservative voters is falling.

The Christian People's Party's voters, on the other hand, are considerably attracted to the conservatives. Well over 40 percent of them consider the conservatives as the best alternative. And more than a third of them see the Center Party as the next best party. Enthusiasm in the CPP for the Labor Party is declining.

Among Center Party voters sympathy for the conservatives suffered a severe blow during the EC-campaign, when sympathy moved instead to the CPP. After 1973 this was again reversed, and the CPP's popularity fell until 1979, and it rose in 1981. Meanwhile the conservative's popularity rose, with a current peak in 1979, and then a decline in 1981. For the Center Party the experiences in the new government will count heavily when the voters this autumn make their judgment.

As already mentioned, these up-to-date figures, including as well the last election, reflect in general terms the situation prior to the new public opinion poll of the autumn: the 1983 municipal government elections. Opinion polls taken periodically have shown stability since the last elections, with only small variations.

If one breaks these figures down into individual counties, municipalities, and wards, and also for example by age groups, some of the trends are even more striking. This is especially so in regard to the growth of the Progress Party.

Table 1. Stated second preference (next best party) of Labor Party voters.

|                          | <u>1965</u> | <u>1969</u> | <u>1972</u> | <u>1973</u> | <u>1977</u> | <u>1979</u> | <u>1981</u> |
|--------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Communist Party          | 5           | 3           | 3           | -           | 1           | 1           | -           |
| Socialist Left Party     | 37          | 32          | 18          | 46          | 18          | 27          | 33          |
| Liberal Party            | 32          | 42          | 42          | 10          | 16          | 17          | 11          |
| New People's Party       | -           | -           | -           | 8           | 4           | 2           | -           |
| Christian People's Party | 8           | 5           | 8           | 17          | 22          | 16          | 9           |
| Center Party             | 7           | 10          | 11          | 8           | 14          | 10          | 13          |
| Conservative Party       | 11          | 8           | 18          | 10          | 22          | 25          | 26          |
| Progress Party           | -           | -           | -           | 1           | 3           | 2           | 8           |
| Total                    | 100%        | 100%        | 100%        | 100%        | 100%        | 100%        | 100%        |
| N                        | 438         | 429         | 365         | 342         | 586         | 227         | 622         |

Table 2. Stated second preference of conservative voters.

|                      | <u>1965</u> | <u>1969</u> | <u>1972</u> | <u>1973</u> | <u>1977</u> | <u>1979</u> | <u>1981</u> |
|----------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Communist Party      | 0           | 0           | 0           | -           | 0           | 1           | -           |
| Socialist Left Party | 3           | 1           | 1           | 0           | 1           | 1           | 1           |

|                          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
|--------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Labor Party              | 11   | 12   | 41   | 15   | 25   | 22   | 23   |
| Liberal Party            | 53   | 30   | 26   | 10   | 5    | 11   | 5    |
| New People's Party       | -    | -    | -    | 22   | 9    | 5    | -    |
| Christian People's Party | 11   | 9    | 20   | 28   | 39   | 30   | 11   |
| Center Party             | 22   | 48   | 12   | 18   | 10   | 16   | 25   |
| Progress Party           | -    | -    | -    | 7    | 11   | 14   | 34   |
| Total                    | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| N                        | 203  | 153  | 235  | 139  | 338  | 203  | 444  |

Table 3. Stated second preference of Christian People's Party voters.

|                      | <u>1965</u> | <u>1969</u> | <u>1972</u> | <u>1973</u> | <u>1977</u> | <u>1979</u> | <u>1981</u> |
|----------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Communist Party      | 0           | 0           | 0           | -           | 0           | 0           | -           |
| Socialist Left Party | 0           | 0           | 1           | 1           | 1           | 2           | 1           |
| Labor Party          | 12          | 8           | 15          | 21          | 18          | 19          | 11          |
| Liberal Party        | 40          | 32          | 22          | 16          | 9           | 8           | 8           |
| New People's Party   | -           | -           | -           | 2           | 5           | 4           | -           |
| Center Party         | 20          | 43          | 44          | 51          | 29          | 22          | 31          |
| Conservative Party   | 28          | 17          | 18          | 9           | 37          | 45          | 43          |
| Progress Party       | -           | -           | -           | 0           | 1           | 0           | 6           |
| Total                | 100%        | 100%        | 100%        | 100%        | 100%        | 100%        | 100%        |
| N                    | 73          | 65          | 77          | 127         | 150         | 67          | 110         |

Table 4. Stated second preference of Center Party voters

|                          | <u>1965</u> | <u>1969</u> | <u>1972</u> | <u>1973</u> | <u>1977</u> | <u>1979</u> | <u>1981</u> |
|--------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Communist Party          | 0           | 0           | 3           | -           | 0           | 0           | -           |
| Socialist Left Party     | 2           | 2           | 9           | 1           | 1           | 3           | 2           |
| Labor Party              | 10          | 8           | 11          | 9           | 16          | 10          | 15          |
| Liberal Party            | 27          | 33          | 29          | 13          | 15          | 23          | 20          |
| New People's Party       | -           | -           | -           | 0           | 1           | 3           | -           |
| Christian People's Party | 18          | 19          | 40          | 65          | 42          | 20          | 28          |
| Conservative Party       | 43          | 38          | 8           | 11          | 24          | 41          | 32          |
| Progress Party           | -           | -           | -           | 1           | 1           | 0           | 2           |
| Total                    | 100%        | 100%        | 100%        | 100%        | 100%        | 100%        | 100%        |
| N                        | 126         | 129         | 153         | 155         | 127         | 39          | 91          |

9906

CSO: 3639/152

## NONSOCIALIST PARTIES UNITE IN SEEING FUND AS ELECTION ISSUE

Stockholm 7 DAGAR in Swedish 29 Jul 83 p 9

/Text/ The opponents of the Industrial Funds are back again this summer. A motley group of "Oland's business community" was gathered together this week for a meeting at Hotel Strand in Borgholm. Among others there was Thorbjorn Falldin, the dance orchestra Moustache, the vocalist Lill Lindfors and two of the lesser known in the brother trio Nordahl, who helped Sweden win the Olympic gold medal in soccer in London in 1948.

As in the nuclear power question, a referendum is now being discussed. But if the political establishment is divided on the factual question, it is all the more united in regard to the question of a referendum. The motives are both tactical and principal in nature. The three nonsocialist parties hope to topple the government in the next election on the fund question. If it becomes a matter of a referendum, it won't be as useful as a political weapon.

The objection in principal is that political questions should be decided in the parliament. In an editorial in STOCKHOLMS-TIDNINGEN a referendum is rejected for the following reason: "Dagens proposal (the fund proposal to be a government bill this fall) can be best described as a change in the corporation tax...making such changes must be regarded as being within the authority of the majority of the Riksdag--otherwise the function of both the Government and the Riksdag is eliminated."

## Liquidation Plan

In SVENSKA DAGBLADET Professor Assar Lindbeck and Docent Hans Tson Soderstrom have already liquidated the funds which have not yet been established. If the Social Democrats lose the next election, the liquidation will begin on 1 January 1986 and will be completed 2 years later. The monies which have already flowed into the five proposed funds will be diverted into the pension system.

Lindbeck/Soderstrom believe that a depletion of the pension funds will still require an increase in the social fees. Both debaters have at least one point of contact with fund debater of a quite different type--Socialist Per Kagesson. In an article in DAGENS NYHETER he criticizes the fund proposal from the Left--it does not contribute to an evening-out of wealth.

6893

CS0: 3650/262

## MINISTER FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE ON CHANGES IN OFFICER TRAINING

Vienna PROFIL in German 8 Aug 83 p 12-13

[Interview with Austrian Minister for National Defense Friedhelm Frischenschlager by Alfred Worm, city councillor, member of the Austrian People's Party (OeVP) date and place not specified.]

[Text] Friedhelm Frischenschlager, 38, was made minister for national defense 3 months ago and given the task of doing away with antiquated military structures. A believer in the peace movement, he describes himself as being "fanatically devoted to the militia," because, as he puts it, "this militia can accomplish our defense mission in an excellent fashion." Frischenschlager therefore wants to concentrate his efforts on restructuring the personnel configuration of the militia army.

[PROFIL] You are probably fed up, Mr Minister, with being asked questions about interceptor aircraft. Let's stick therefore to the more mundane management of the army. What's new in training?

[Frischenschlager] I think that the time for restructuring is at hand. We must break new ground, in training too.

[PROFIL] You are saying that you want to concentrate your entire army policy on the militia?

[Frischenschlager] Correct!

[PROFIL] What then is your concept for changing the training picture?

[Frischenschlager] At present, our training is still oriented mainly toward a standing army and not toward a militia. The reservists have learned something or other at some time or another; they are occasionally brought on active duty for exercises where they once again learn something about everything and are indoctrinated with the entire gamut of military knowledge. But in the end they are still small-time soldiers.



[PROFIL] And that is called "general knowledge?"

[Frischenschlager] That's a cute way of putting it--but in reality this is not appropriate for the militia. A militia soldier should only know those things which correspond to his functions in the militia army. But he should be thoroughly proficient in that area. As far as I'm concerned, a reservist has no need whatever to know everything that a regular career officer knows, but only have the reservist training dealing with his particular functions!

[PROFIL] To follow your train of thought, I have to ask for some examples. Would it mean, for instance, that in the future an engineer corps private in a militia unit, being ordered to participate in a 2-week exercise every other year, would not have to refresh his knowledge of the overall engineer corps functions--bridge building, explosives, barrier construction, etc.--but that he can restrict his knowledge to the area of his militia functions?

[Frischenschlager] That's it! If a reservist in the militia army is a barrier construction officer, for instance, he should completely concentrate his efforts on that task. There is no need for him to keep up to date on bridge building also.

[PROFIL] You are talking about training chopped down to the eventual function within the militia?

[Frischenschlager] That's the beauty of it. The militia soldier should be equally proficient in his function as a career soldier--any training over and beyond that should be entirely voluntary.

[PROFIL] In other words, you are opposed to broad-based training for reservists?

[Frischenschlager] Certainly! The militia army is built upon a backbone of reservists--the career soldiers are only a benevolent contribution by the system. But the reservist is the normal component--some people can't get that into their heads!

[PROFIL] If I read you correctly, it would mean that a reservist with basic infantry training whose militia assignment would be that of second machine gunner in some rural defense battalion would, according to you, be nothing other than the second machine gunner in any exercise--anything beyond that would be voluntary on his part?

[Frischenschlager] Yes, indeed! At the officer level it would mean that the 14-day reserve officer training covering the entire gamut of military knowledge would really be a waste of time. It is sufficient for him to prepare himself completely for the specific task assigned to him. Any other continuing education is entirely up to the reservist.

[PROFIL] How do you visualize such voluntary activity?

[Frischenschlager] The army prepares a specific training program. The reservist peruses the program, indicates interest in one or the other subject and enrolls in one or more courses. For instance, to become a unit commander he would have to fulfill certain training requirements, i.e., certain exercises and courses. The basic knowledge can be absorbed by the reservist at home, and then he lets himself be called in for the exercises.

[PROFIL] Let's assume that the reservist has ambitions of becoming a company commander in the militia....

[Frischenschlager] We offer him the opportunity of acquiring theoretical knowledge by homework. After that he only needs a short course at the military academy, brief specialist training, and after that he is assigned to the field--having thereby saved himself an awful lot of time.

[PROFIL] How about staff officer courses?

[Frischenschlager] A good example! Before a reservist can serve as a battalion staff officer these days, he is old and gray by the time he has taken all the courses and other formalities. I have no use for a 50-year old staff officer. I can let him acquire the necessary knowledge to a large extent by working at home while he is still young. Besides, he doesn't have to absorb the entire spectrum of knowledge but only that which corresponds to his future assignment in the militia army.

[PROFIL] To me this looks a bit like military adult education!

[Frischenschlager] I like the way you put it!

[PROFIL] Does that mean also that in the future the reservist will be called up for very brief exercises and that he might even be able to choose the timing for this?

[Frischenschlager] Exactly! We give him an educational opportunity, he picks out what suits him and lets himself be called up. It is mostly left to his own flexibility.

[PROFIL] Sounds very progressive to me!

[Frischenschlager] I still plan to go through with it. Today's army impresses me as being an apparatus with restricted initiative and limited motivation. I believe that the career soldiers must be provided with the courage to think new thoughts....

[PROFIL] How many militiamen will be affected by this?

[Frischenschlager] You know that we are shooting for a 300,000-man militia army. Initially, several tens of thousands of reservists will surely be affected by these innovations.

[PROFIL] When will this be effective?

[Frischenschlager] Immediately!

[PROFIL] This means also that you will gradually eliminate the so-called continuity providers for the system, those who serve 8 months instead of 6 and who then have no further commitment to the army?

[Frischenschlager] We'll see to it that people will serve only 6 months and then do their militia duty as reservists.

[PROFIL] Can you visualize a platoon commander in the militia who is not a high school graduate?

[Frischenschlager] Certainly! Take for example a captain in the firefighting service who knows how to give orders and how to deal with people but who, because he is not a high school graduate, could at best be a sergeant major in the army. To me it is conceivable that such people could occupy leadership positions even without being high school graduates.

[PROFIL] Won't this lead to rebellion in your officer corps?

[Frischenschlager] It is about time for breaking new ground in the army too! The regimental commanders will surely be grateful for it!

9273

CSO: 3620/425

## GENERAL STAFF CHIEF'S REMARKS CREATE STIR

## Instability From Military Changes

Porto O PRIMEIRO DE JANEIRO in Portuguese 19 Jul 83 p 7

[Text] This newspaper has learned from military sources that General Melo Egidio, chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, was at the Ministry of Defense yesterday in response to a summons by the ministry's head, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Mota Pinto. Mota Pinto's office confirmed to us that there had been a meeting but did not say what matters had been discussed.

Government sources told O PRIMEIRO DE JANEIRO, however, that Mota Pinto and Melo Egidio had analyzed recent statements by the latter concerning the issue of the heads of the armed services.

It should be recalled that Melo Egidio had said in Madeira that "replacing the heads of the armed services always causes instability" and that only "in exceptional situations" could such replacements occur.

The Armed Forces chief of staff denied "absolutely" that his recent statements in Madeira concerning replacement of the heads of the armed services might constitute any kind of "political warning" to the government.

That is how Melo Egidio, who was returning from that autonomous region, has responded to the accusation directed at him this week by former Secretary of State Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa. Rebelo de Sousa had charged that the general's statement that replacing the heads of the armed services causes destabilization could be interpreted as "a political warning to the government."

The Armed Forces chief of staff said: "I stand by what I said in Madeira and maintain that it does not lend itself to speculation."

He explained that in his two contacts with Minister of Defense Mota Pinto, the matter of replacing the heads of the armed services was not mentioned to him, and he therefore does not know whether the government intends to replace them.

Melo Egidio added: "The question they asked me in Madeira was whether the replacement of the heads of the armed services, if it took place, would cause disturbance. I answered that given the special nature of the institution, a replacement always causes disturbance unless it is done for exceptional reasons."

### Madeira Official Concurs

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 21 Jul 83 p 4

[Excerpt] Alberto Joao Jardim, chairman of the Madeira Regional Government, says he agrees with the Armed Forces chief of staff "when he says that replacement of the heads of the armed services may cause destabilization."

Joao Jardim told ANOP: "In a country with characteristics like ours, where any action by the government is always assigned excessive and undue public importance, it is natural that the same thing should happen when the government meddles with the heads of the armed services."

Joao Jardim emphasized that "this situation must not be dramatized, nor must it constitute grounds for the immediate creation of 'political acts,' cause divisive confrontations between the government of the republic and the Armed Forces, or require tests of strength."

In the matter of the public office held by the CEMGFA [Armed Forces chief of staff], who occupies the highest post in the operational military hierarchy, the choice must be decided through "some degree of consultation with the military staffs, but the government has sovereign power to appoint whomever it chooses as heads of the armed services and to do so whenever it chooses," he said.

### Statement Protested

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 21 Jul 83 p 8

[Commentary by Alves Fernandes]

[Excerpt] The weakness of the government, which cannot be obscured by timid signs of authority, is beginning to be obvious, and it has nothing to do with the solemn affirmations being made. Evidence beyond suspicion has also been documented through the incredible attitude adopted by the Armed Forces chief of staff, who has taken the liberty of "defying" the legitimate government voted into office by the only sovereign power, the people, and absolutely nothing has happened as a result. In a clear and unspeakable political warning to the government, General Melo Egidio took it upon himself to proclaim that replacing the heads of the armed services would cause destabilization, given the "special nature" of the Armed Forces. That statement is intended very objectively to remind people that the institution--some of it, of course--is not prepared to accept immediate subordination to the civilian government. It is thus demanding the continuation of a special status for what some people regard as a corporate entity. The government wasted a good opportunity to put the army in its proper place--and, above all, to duly react by immediately dismissing the author of the "political warning" in question.

11798

CSO: 3542/183

## ARMED FORCES HIGHER RANK PROMOTIONS, APPOINTMENTS

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 21 Jul 83 p 27

[Text] At its meeting last Monday, the Higher Council for National Defense reached several decisions concerning top positions in the military hierarchy and promotions to general and brigadier general.

The council is presided over by the president of the republic and consists of the prime minister, the deputy prime ministers, some members of the cabinet (defense, foreign affairs, finance, and others), the ministers of the republic and the chairmen of the regional governments of the Azores and Madeira, two deputies to the Assembly of the Republic, and the chiefs of staff (the EMGFA [Armed Forces General Staff] and the staffs of the three branches).

As regards changes in the hierarchy, the council decided to appoint Gen Jorge da Costa Salazar Braga, 58, deputy chief of the EME [Army General Staff]. Previously quartermaster-general, he replaces General Lopes Alves, who recently entered the reserve. It also appointed Vice Adm Henrique Antonio Chambel Serpa Quaresma Abreu e Lima Matos de Vasconcelos, 56, deputy chief of the EMA [Navy General Staff]. The new deputy chief of staff was formerly director of the Navy Electricity and Communications Department.

The following brigadier generals were promoted to army general: Carlos Elmano Rocha, 57, of the Infantry, who was formerly deputy commander of the Lisbon Military Region; Francisco Jose Pinto Correia, 54, of the Signal Corps, formerly assigned to the EMGFA but now to become director of his branch; and Joao Antonio Leite Pacheco Rodrigues, 54, of the Artillery Arm, of which he is currently director.

The following colonels were promoted to brigadier general: Fausto Marques, 52; Francisco Cabral Couto, 48; and Tito Capela, 53, all of the Infantry; as well as Perry da Camara, 53, currently director of the Military College; and Verissimo Baptista, 53, both of the Engineers; and Antunes Pinheiro, 53, a physician.

In the navy, the following rear admirals were promoted to vice admiral: Eduardo Manuel Ribeiro da Silva, 54, and Antonio Goncalves Ramos, 53. Both are line officers.

The following captains were promoted to rear admiral: Artur Rodrigues Consolado, 50; Antonio Alves Sameiro, 48; Augusto Filipe da Silva, 51; and Antonio Carlos Fuzeta da Ponte, 48, all of them line officers.

There was only one promotion in the air force: Col Jose Calvao Borges was promoted to brigadier general.

11798

CSO: 3542/183

## AZORES INTEGRATION IN IBERO-ATLANTIC AREA ISSUE RAISED

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 4 Aug 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Broken Triangle"]

[Text] Less than a year ago, Portugal obtained from its NATO partners the fulfillment of a long-standing aspiration: the raising of the Ibero-Atlantic Area Command with headquarters in Oeiras to the rank of a chief command and, simultaneously, the appointment of a Portuguese officer (Vice-Adm Elias da Costa) to the post of commander. As was remarked at the time, rather than an undeserved honor or a benevolent gesture, this was an act of justice. Today, another desire cherished by the Portuguese military is a concern of our diplomats: It involves the integration of the Azores into the Ibero-Atlantic Area, so as to allow the archipelago to come under the Oeiras command.

Strange as it may seem, to those less familiar with these matters, the so often discussed continent-Madeira-Azores strategic triangle is currently "broken" from the standpoint of the NATO command structure. In fact, whereas the continental territory and the Autonomous Region of Madeira come under the Oeiras command, the nine islands of the Azores belong to the zone subordinate to the West Atlantic Command, with headquarters in Norfolk (U.S.A.), a command which is exercised cumulatively by one of the three NATO supreme commands and SACLANT, also established in that North American location. Hence, the forces stationed in the Azores obey orders emanating from Norfolk, while those of Madeira and the continent retain their link with the Oeiras command.

The technical advantages of including the Azores in the Ibero-Atlantic Area, both for the Autonomous Region and for NATO itself, have already been proven by Portuguese specialists. In their view, the archipelago could have its position in the NATO context strengthened by the mere fact of coming under a command (that of the Ibero-Atlantic Area) which, on the Alliance's table of organization, is a degree higher than the one to which it currently belongs.

Apart from this issue and others of an operational nature, it seems obvious that Portugal's chief motivation stems from a desire for the nation as a whole to have in the NATO structures a fitting, homogeneous status, so that the strategic triangle will not continue to be broken from the standpoint of the Atlantic Alliance's chain of command. The problem assumes greater severity and Portugal's intention makes more sense if we recall that, at the time when Spain joined NATO, in the



political area the then UCD [Democratic Center Union] secretary for foreign relations, Xavier Ruperez, admitted the possibility that Madrid might demand a single Iberian command established on Spanish territory, a hypothesis which Portugal, of course, could not accept.

It is obvious that the Azores' inclusion in the NATO commands is not associated merely with the status of bilateral relations between Portugal and the United States, wherein negotiations are under way regarding the Lajes Base. But it would not be surprising if, in the talks to renew the agreement, the Portuguese negotiators were to bring up that complex issue. And while it is true that Washington's desire will not suffice to have Lisbon's demand accepted, it is also clear that this will be a deciding factor.

2909

CSO: 3542/200

## BIOGRAPHIES, ATTRIBUTES OF ARMED FORCES CHIEF PERSONALITIES

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 12 Aug 83 pp 16-18

[Article by Cesario Borga: "Those Commanding the Armed Forces"]

[Excerpts] Melo Egidio:



According to the terms of the Law on Defense and Armed Forces the general staff chief of the Armed Forces is "the military chief with the highest authority in the Armed Forces echelons," and the one answerable to the government "for the training, discipline and utilization of the Armed Forces, as well as for the coordination of the respective branches." In the event of war, he is responsible for the "military leadership of the war," assisted by the chiefs of staff of the Army, Navy and Air Force.

Gen Melo Egidio is 61 years of age. He is only 6 months away from leaving the post because of reaching the age limit. A few weeks ago, the date 18 February 1984, when the general will be 62 years old, had a certain amount of significance, when the defense minister, Mota Pinto, announced that the government would not undertake any changes in the military command positions until that date; which, in fact, was not the case. The first time that Melo Egidio's name reached the headlines of newspapers was in September 1975, at the height of the "hot summer." He was a brigadier then. The Council of the Revolution, inspired by the "Nine," had just created AMI (Military Intervention Group), naming Melo Agidio as its commander.

The force remained directly subordinate to the president of the republic, and was comprised of two companies of riflemen, two companies of paratroopers and one company of commandos. In fact, it was an alternative force to COPCON [Continental Operations Command]. Even before its actual establishment, AMI was publicly attacked as a repressive force, and never went so far as to act as such. However, Melo Egidio's appointment was viewed with distrust by all the extreme leftist forces and those connected with PCP [Portuguese Communist Party].

#### An 'Operational Type'

Melo Egidio was considered an "operational type," which was confirmed by his service record. 25 April caught him at the height of a colonial war, as commander of the Tete sector. After the Lusaca agreements, he joined Vitor Crespo's group which prepared the transfer of power to FRELIMO [Mozambique Liberation Front].

After 25 November, he worked with Eanes on the Armed Forces General Staff, in which he became assistant coordinator of CEMFGA [Armed Forces Chief of Staff]. In 1978, he was named governor of Macau and, in 1981, chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, the first one, after 25 April, who did not at the same time hold a political post with great responsibility and, after September 1974, the first not to be simultaneously president of the republic.

When Melo Egidio reached the general staff, as has been the case until recently, the position was only a high-ranking one; an impressive title but with little actual power. The power of his two predecessors (Costa Gomes and Ramalho Eanes) stemmed from the fact that they were also presidents and, consequently, supreme commanders of the Armed Forces, and in that capacity appointing and dismissing the chiefs of staff of the branches. In addition, they presided over the Council of the Revolution, which had the authority to legislate on military affairs. Melo Egidio would hold the position without any of those protections. He had no disciplinary authority over the chiefs of staff of the branches, in which there could actually be little interference. Although he was assigned vague coordinating functions, he was really only the "first among equals."

The Law on Defense and Armed Forces, which has been in effect since last December, was to change this situation (but not substantially). CEMFGA now has broader powers; he is obviously responsible for the "training, discipline and utilization of the Armed Forces," but he can only propose "the appointment and dismissal of the commanders in chief." He is still far removed from being the executive commander of the land, sea and air forces, and from directly commanding common services, or that of intelligence, and others, and from having disciplinary authority over the chiefs of staff of the branches. It is true that CEMFGA has carried more weight since 13 December 1982, but the Armed Forces are still, during peacetime, a corps with four heads that the political leaders play with in well or poorly played competition. The situation changes slightly during wartime. The law stipulates that, in this situation, the general staff chief of the Armed Forces in fact is to command all the military forces. But the experience of the past 100 years has proven that the chiefs of staff carry weight and are important during peacetime: first, because since 1811 Portugal has not been invaded by a foreign army, and is not likely to be invaded within the next few years; second, because when, during that period, we participated in distant wars (1914-18 and a colonial war), it was the commanders


of the operational forces that gained military and political importance, to the detriment of the high-ranking military chiefs in the rear guard.

Garcia dos Santos:



During recent weeks, Gen Garcia dos Santos has been a person too much discussed to leave anything else to say about him in this article. His biography and information on the powerful military machine that he commands have been widely publicized in the two previous issues of O JORNAL, and we refer new readers to the latter issue in particular. However, it should be stressed that his position as Army chief of staff is still the most important post in the Portuguese military structure, despite the fact that it is not the highest ranking one in the chain of command. At all difficult times for the country, the Army has been the most critical branch and the one with the most political and military influence. It is still to the Army that the vast majority of Portuguese youths recruited for military service go. Finally, the Army still has by far the largest number of personnel, currently estimated at 37,000.

Silva Horta, Chief of the Military Household of the President of the Republic:



Adm Silva Horta is chief of the Military Household of the President of the Republic. Without the power that the very same office has in other countries, he plays essentially the role of a presidential adviser.

Lemos Ferreira:



The Air Force chief of staff is the highest-ranking authority in his sector, and the direct collaborator of the defense minister and the Armed Forces general staff chief. Within his branch, the chief of staff has extensive authority, ranging from the determination of doctrine, utilization, organization, equipment and instruction to the administration of justice and discipline. In the event of war, he assists the general staff chief in the military leadership of operations.

At the age of 53, Lemos Ferreira is currently the dean of chiefs of staff. He was appointed in January 1977, and appears to be strongly entrenched in his post, despite the controversies that he has often caused and a certain amount of internal challenging to which he has been subjected. Among all the chiefs of staff, he is the one who reflects the most tired image outside of the branch that he commands, but who, despite this, seems to be withstanding the changes that the government intends to make in the high military echelons.

In early 1977, Lemos Ferreira received a poorly equipped Air Force with problems difficult to surmount, which he attempted to solve by relying 100 percent on aid from the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany that, at the end of 6 years, may not have entirely suited the general's ambitions. Operating with survival budgets as, moreover, holds true for other branches, the reequipping of the Air force was achieved somewhat on the basis of American and German generosity, from which it received, in particular, aircraft of the G-91 Fiat (FRG), and T-38 and A-7P Corsair (U.S.) type.

But that assistance is far removed from solving the country's air defense problems, since it lacks a modern squadron for interception, sophisticated civil and military detection facilities and significant progress in the electronic warfare area. It might be said that, in the event of war, our air defense would depend primarily on

the immediate assistance that we could receive from NATO through Eurocontrol; which actually makes us dependent on Spain, now that the latter country is a member of NATO.

The goals that appear to be those of the current chief of staff may be far removed from attainment, and the problem would not arise for the present if the Air Force of a country such as ours could have a different orientation; inasmuch as the potential for transporting troops and for air and sea coverage is slight.


#### Conservative Backing

Throughout his term, Gen Lemos Ferreira has been the chief of staff with the most marked orientation of a conservative bent. The Air Force has been the branch wherein the amnesty law met with the most difficulty for its implementation; and the movement of military men associated with the defunct Council of the Revolution and, subsequently, the 25 April Association, have always been the ones most closely watched. Internal and external intervention, such as the well-known reaction in 1979 due to the non-approval of the budget by the Assembly of the Republic, made him one of the leading military backers of the Mota Pinto government.

Lemos Ferreira's dismissal, often announced since 1980, has always been belied by the facts, but it has evoked systematic negative reaction among right wing sectors and support from the left wing. In January 1981, when that dismissal became imminent, Lemos Ferreira obtained the backing of most of the generals who met for that purpose, and the meeting was widely publicized.

Lemos Ferreira was a colonel on 25 April 1974. His last important mission was the command of the Bissau Air Base, when the Air Force was already experiencing great difficulty crossing the skies of Guinea. He was promoted to brigadier in 1974, and was appointed chief of the Third Department of EMFA [Air Force Staff]; and, the following year, he was named deputy chief of staff, now heading the latter. In 1976, he was promoted to the rank of general.

Sousa Leitao



The Navy chief of staff is the highest-ranking authority in the Navy. He works under the direction of the defense minister, through the Armed Forces general staff chief, who cooperates in directing operations in the event of war. During peacetime, he is responsible for solving all the administrative, disciplinary and operational problems of the branch that he commands.

Adm Sousa Leitao is 52 years old, and has commanded the Navy since October 1978. At times challenged, as occurred as recently as last year, in an extensive "open letter," Adm Sousa Leitao's performance has been typified by an attempt to lend the Navy an image of unity and as a branch of the Armed Forces wherein there are not many problems.

His speeches have been systematically directed toward reequipping the Navy, stressing the branch's responsibilities for overseeing the extensive ocean area under the authority of the Portuguese state, as well as its responsibilities on the international level, with emphasis on the commitments assumed with respect to NATO.

Despite its meager equipment, the Navy is still the branch of the Armed Forces with the greatest immediate importance in the Atlantic Alliance's operational plan. The fact that the command of the Ibero-Atlantic Area is located on Portuguese territory, and headed by a Portuguese officer, has made our fleet's naval forces, on the immediate level, the ones that the Ibero-Atlantic command has available for any eventuality. This is why the bulk of the naval forces (seven frigates and three submarines) are subordinate to NATO; in other words, to the Ibero-Atlantic command.

The Navy has about 13,000 men and equipment that is not very well suited to its main missions. As in the case of other branches, it has not yet completely revised the adjustments that were forced upon it during the colonial war. For that reason, nearly 50 percent of the ships that it has are small vessels intended to operate in coastal waters, which are therefore unsuited for many of the missions for which it has now been assigned.

Nevertheless, of the three branches, and owing to its closer association with NATO, the Navy is still the sector of the Armed Forces best prepared to remain in combat for a certain amount of time. Its main units could withstand about 3 months without requiring special backup and without running the risk of being left immobilized for lack of logistical support.

#### The Weak Points

But the Navy also has many weak points. Owing to the sophisticated materiel that it uses, as in the case of the Air Force, it depends on the external market for spare parts and new equipment. It has no system of its own for fuel maintenance, and it has a slight capacity in the area of ocean transport facilities; in addition to the fact that nearly all the personnel, storage facilities, and maintenance and repair facilities are concentrated in Lisbon. The experts point out that the Navy would capsize on the day that the port of Lisbon was taken by any enemy force.

These distortions have not been corrected in the slightest, and it is quite understandable that they will not be in the very near future. Sousa Leitao, who may

have focused his attention on the reequipping, dealing with the increasing difficulties in carrying it out, appears to be content, in other respects, with running what exists in the best possible way, without causing major problems.

Adm Sousa Leitao who, from all indications, will remain for a few more years as head of the Navy, began his military career in 1944, as a naval cadet; and he became a general officer (rear admiral) 32 years later, in 1976. He is quite familiar with the Spanish Navy, having carried out assignments on the Portuguese-Spanish technical commission; and he was chairman of the Portuguese delegation in the peninsular staffs in 1977 and 1978. As holds true for most of the higher-ranking naval officers, he has had several stays in the United States for instruction.

Tome Pinto, Commander of the GNR:



An unusual military career, which led him to become general commander of the Republican National Guard at the early age of 46 (one of the youngest ever in the entire history of the corps) distinguishes Gen Alipio Tome Pinto. It is this convinced individual from across the mountains, born in Torre de Moncorvo (who does not miss any festival in his region that he can attend and to which he is invited), who commands a force that currently has over 16,000 men, divided into five battalions, distributed over 500 posts throughout the entire country, whose action ranges from rural policing to traffic supervision.

#### Critical Missions

But, beyond these specific tasks, GNR, which was created (on 3-5-1911) as a force to defend the regime established on 5 October 1910, has assumed evident importance among our Armed Forces as a whole, and has often been summoned for certain "critical" missions to take action in heated matters, ranging from the intervention area of agrarian reform (currently) to the issue of Vizela or the borders between Lever and Crestuma, particularly with a special intervention force which, in this case, is called a cavalry regiment.



With its own cadres of professional sergeants and enlisted men, but with all its officers belonging to the Army cadres, under the dictatorship regime GNR was one of the services with the government's complete confidence, because, generally speaking, its higher-ranking cadres were carefully selected from those friendly toward the regime. Relatively well equipped, GNR was thus the force which, based on the "plans" devised during the fascist period, the rulers had to choose in case of emergency, especially in the event of an attempted coup d'etat. Hence, it was no coincidence that, on 25 April 1974, Marcello Caetano took refuge at the general headquarters, and that Carmo's surrender meant the downfall of fascism.

After a phase during which, owing to this reality and also the "subsequent complexes" that it produced (complexes increased by the alleged involvement of some of its officers in activities against the new regime emerging from the revolution as well), GNR seemed to be destabilized and rather inoperative, the entity achieved a new equilibrium and a new image, which was only upset here and there by individual incidents through the action of its troops intervening in the most heated areas and situations.

A great contribution was made to this current image and position that it has by its former commander, Gen Passos de Esmeriz, who commanded it from 1978 until 27 August 1982 (he had meanwhile reached the age limit and transferred to the reserves), the date on which Gen Tome Pinto took office. Despite the fact that he was appointed by one who was a democratic, legalistic officer, considered by observers to have been a correct choice, along the line of his predecessor, on GNR Day, 48 hours after the May Day incidents in Porto cost the lives of two workers, he did not hesitate to say: "It is impossible to act in the name of the authorities, creating a worse evil than the one that it is being attempted to prevent or stop."

Tome Pinto was promoted to the rank of general in May 1981 (also one of the youngest Portuguese generals) after, as a brigadier (a status to which he was promoted in January 1979, at the end of the IAEM [Institute of Advanced Military Studies] course in which he received the best grades) having served as commander of the powerful NATO Brigade, from which he was transferred to CEMGFA assistant for personnel and logistics.

During the revolutionary period, or the one for consolidation of democracy, Tome Pinto always seemed to be backing the moderate positions of the "Group of Nine," and was also (in addition to the nine members of the Council of the Revolution that gave the document its name) one of its first signers, along with Ramalho Eanes, Garcia dos Santos, Loureiro dos Santos, Rocha Vieira, etc. And he joined and was a participant in the military restraint group of 25 November, collaborating with Ramalho Eanes, whose personal friend he had been for some time.

Immediately after Vasco Lourenco replaced Otelo as commander of the Lisbon Military Region, Tome Pinto was his chief of staff, always showing a great professional and technical ability. In 1976, his backing for Ramalho Eanes' candidacy for the presidency of the republic was obvious.

#### Position Towards Eanes

Subsequently, at least during certain periods, there may have been a dissociation, and for a long time, behind the scenes of the military, wherein there was talk about

"who was supporting whom," Tome Pinto was among those (like a Firmino Miguel, for example), whose position was regarded as "dubious." The final impression on that level was that he would end up inclining towards Eanes, with the opposite happening in the case of Firmino Miguel (although neither one of them assumed any public position in this regard).

As GNR commander, Gen Tome Pinto has maintained a position that is generally considered quite proper, marked by moderation and within democratic legality; applying force only as a last resort, and at the same time attempting to modernize the entity.

Almeida Bruno, General Commander of PSP



Brig Gen Almeida Bruno is one of the general officers from the new generation, who was involved in the captains' movement; and he was among the officers then known to be a prominent member of the so-called Spínolist wing. The two arrests with a contrary indication to which he was subjected (after the incidents of 16 March 1974, and of 11 March 1975) attested to the association that he has always had with Marshal Spínola; a bond begun in Guinea, where Almeida Bruno conquered Torre and Espada, and worked with the African commando groups.

Almeida Bruno has been general commander of PSP [Public Security Police] since December 1980. He replaced Gen Lopes Alves, who did not get along with the then prime minister, Sá Carneiro.

The police corps that he commands has about 18,000 members. It is under the direct orders of the minister of internal administration, and only in the event of war does it become directly subordinate to the Armed Forces general staff chief. The vast majority of the PSP members are distributed among the urban centers on the

continent and in the autonomous regions. PSP has district commands and two groups coming directly under the general command, which can operate in any part of the national territory: the Intervention Police and the GOES (Special Operations Group), trained to act in very violent situations after receiving an express order from the government.

Almeida Bruno's command has not confronted any difficulties, either within the corps or in the always difficult realm of relations between the police and the public. About a year ago, documents of police groups were disclosed which challenged the atmosphere inside the corps and, during recent months, there have been outbreaks of friction between the command and the elements promoting the Police Union, a movement that Almeida Bruno has systematically opposed.

As for the image that PSP has conveyed outside, it cannot be claimed that the positive situations have predominated. In addition to difficulties with respect to journalists, there has been an increase in the disclosures of cases that are not advantageous to the corps, involving brawls which are not very justified in the eyes of the public, and an increase in the violence perpetrated within the squads. But it was the action of the Intervention Police in operations categorized as being to maintain public order that most accentuated the negative image of the police among the public. In this instance, there is the action taken in the Luz stadium in May 1981, at Rossio on 12 February during the first general strike called by CGTP-IN [General Federation of Portuguese Workers/National Intersindical] and on May Day of the same year in Porto.

The PSP command has often stressed the fact that people remember only the negative cases, and forget the daily, anonymous action of the police to combat crime and violence. But although the police's relations with the public are difficult everywhere, the questions raised have seldom received satisfactory answers. Those questions relate primarily to the reasons for such action. In the instances of Rossio and the Luz stadium, the Intervention Police action was regarded by the public as unwarranted, and even as the cause of non-existent conflicts. As for May Day 1982, the violence used was considered manifestly excessive. In this case, PSP was accused of having caused deaths without any justification. In the recent case of the occupation of Lisnave, the police intervention succeeded in preventing accidents and has kept the challenging in the political area, which enables them to argue that they were only obeying orders from the government.

Elias da Costa, Commander of CICIBERLANT



Adm Elias da Costa is the first Portuguese to head a major NATO command, namely, CICIBERLANT, established at Oeiras. He is, simultaneously, naval commander of the continent. Adm Elias da Costa was deputy commander of COMIBERLANT. He entered the Naval Academy in 1946, and is among the naval officers most familiar not only with the Portuguese Navy, but also the European and American Navies, having spent periods of time studying in the latter areas on several occasions. Although his position in the Navy is not very important, the fact that he simultaneously holds the post of commander of the Ibero-Atlantic Area has caused him to be the member of the Portuguese military who, in the event of war, has under his command the most powerful means of destruction; and, under those undesirable circumstances, he would assume far greater importance than would the Navy's high commands themselves.

Since 22 June 1981, Brig Gen Rogerio Augusto Garrett da Silva e Castro has been commander of the First Independent Joint Brigade. Born in Porto on 28 August 1929, Brig Gen Silva e Castro entered the Army School, now the Military Academy, in November 1948, and was promoted to the rank of lieutenant in the infantry branch 6 years later. From October 1963 to July 1966, he attended the staff course, following which he served on the Army Staff, in the fourth logistics department, and in the Lisbon Military Region, as chief of staff. In 1976, he was promoted to the rank of colonel in the same branch (infantry), discharging the duties of chief of the third department of the Army Staff [EME] and of commander of the Infantry Drill School. Promoted to the rank of brigadier in 1980, he was appointed director of the Army's physical education service, a post that he held until his appointment as commander of the First Independent Joint Brigade.

During the campaigns in Africa, he served on four service commissions, with troop command and staff functions.

Brig Gen Silva e Castro hold several awards and decorations, including the Distinguished Service Medal with Palm, the Medal of Military Merit and the Order of Aviz.

Brig Gen Silva e Castro currently commands the best equipped and best trained Army unit, the only permanently established one that the Army has. The Independent Joint Brigade, with headquarters in Santa Margarida, is in fact especially intended for NATO operations and its members, who are highly trained, are often rotated abroad. It may be claimed that this unit is the only one that does not suffer from the Army's general inadequacies with respect to equipment, weapons and personnel; and its importance stems from the fact that, at the present time, from an operational standpoint, any force operations within the Army that had the Independent Joint Brigade as an adversary would encounter difficulty.

2909

CSO: 3542/200

MILITARY

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

DEFENSE ATTACHE TO MOZAMBIQUE--For the first time, Portugal is going to have a defense attache in its embassy in Maputo. The attache will be Infantry Col Eduardo Cesar Franco Belico Velasco, who has served on the Armed Forces General Staff for over 4 years as chief of the Operations Division, First Section. In a public commendation published yesterday in the DIARIO DA REPUBLICA, General Melo Egidio, chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, emphasized Colonel Velasco's activity in the field of national planning for exercises and the coordination he has established in the areas of deactivating explosives and camouflage, activities which he has vitalized or intensified in a very positive way. [Text] [Porto O PRIMEIRO DE JANEIRO in Portuguese 21 Jul 83 p 6] 11798

CSO: 3542/183

## COUNTRY QUITTING EUMETSAT PROJECT AFTER DECADE AS MEMBER

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 6 Jul 83 p 1

[Article by Michael Rastrup Smith]

[Text] Denmark has abandoned the cooperative European meteorological project after 10 years of membership.

This means that Denmark no longer has legal access to a great deal of vital satellite data. And for the Terma electronics factory in Arhus, this means losing an order for satellite parts worth 12 million kroner, which was won in bidding with a number of other European participants.

"It was extremely lethargic of Denmark to withdraw from the European satellite cooperation," said Johannes Jacobsen, director of Terma in Arhus. "We have been part of the cooperation for the last 10 years, because it was deemed essential by both meteorologists and industry. We have gained a lot of know-how from the cooperation. We will lose that now along with an order worth millions."

Denmark's past participation in the European meteorological satellite cooperation was financed by the Ministry of Education, because until now it was regarded as a development project. But now it has come so far that a new organization, EUMETSAT, has been formed to handle the daily satellite cooperation.

To remain part of the satellite cooperation, Denmark must join the organization. At first, a fee of 60 million kroner was required for our membership. But after negotiations, we came down to a special price of only 18 million kroner. The money, which can be paid off at 1.5 million kroner a year, was to come from the budget of the Meteorological Institute.

It was suggested that Denmark, like Sweden, get the money by saving on the amount used to pay for several weather ships that are located in the North Atlantic. While Sweden did get money from this account, the meteorologists at the Meteorological Institute did not think they could do without the information from the weather ships. And since the money could not be

provided through other savings, the institute's ministry (the Ministry for Public Works) was unable to make a request to the Finance Committee.

Denmark then had to withdraw from the meteorological satellite project. This means that we will lose legal access to weather information and pictures from EUMETSAT's satellite. If we had remained as part of the project, Danish firms would also have been entitled to compensation orders for the amount of money we paid into the project (18 million kroner).

That is why the highly specialized Danish electronics firm, Terma, did not receive the orders worth 12 million kroner that it had won in a joint European bid.

6578

CSO: 3613/173

## OFFICIALS WORRIED OVER CHEMICAL FIRM'S COMBUSTING OF PCB'S

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 2 Aug 83 p 6

[Article: "Suspected Toxic Discharges Being Investigated in Tampere; Nokia Oy Denies Having Burned PCB Waste"]

[Text] Tampere (HS)—In Tampere they are trying to determine whether toxins hazardous to the environment belched out of a pipe at Nokia's condenser plant during the first half of July. The old plant is located on the Hatanpaa road in the middle of the city. Alongside it is the Tampere Municipal Health Center, among other buildings, with its patient wards.

A sample sent to the State Technical Research Center (VTT) by a worker who had observed the burning [of waste] contained at least from 10 to 20 percent of PCB compounds at the worst.

Tampere Criminal Police inspector Elis Sihvo would only admit that the matter is being investigated. At this point he could say no more than that. The Hame Province Environmental Protection Committee's request for an investigation was also unofficial, issued by telephone.

The police are expecting the results of the investigation on Wednesday.

Until then the results obtained from the samples sent by the worker will have to be used. According to the worker, Markku Martin, who works as a foreman at Nokia, about 3,000 liters of waste fluid were burned in condenser plant ovens between 6 and 11 July.

The VTT has confirmed the fact that the water samples contained 10 percent by weight of PCB compounds, 20 percent sludge and 1 percent crushed material.

## Nokia Denies Having Burned Toxic Substances

According to Nokia Oy, the report on toxic substances, according to which the old condenser plant in Hatanpaa has burned as much as hundreds of kilograms of PCB, is based on incorrect information.

According to information chief Thomas Zilliacus, only saturation material, which does not contain PCB and is in itself completely harmless, was burned.



According to Zilliacus, the material that was burned was collected from a vat on the bottom of which PCB from those substances the company used over 3 years ago had hardened. Small, milligram-sized amounts of this bottom sediment may have dissolved into the liquids that were burned. At the company, however, they said that the bottom sediment itself was not burned.

According to Nokia, a worker from another firm who sent the samples to the VTT took his samples from the bottom sediment, not the burnt material.

#### "Nails Softened and Hands Itched"

In early July Nokia's condenser plant was moved to the Kalkku section of town and the old plant on the Hatanpaa road was torn down. According to Martin, who turned in the report, the hazardous substances were carelessly handled. Some of the waste liquids are still in toxic substance storage, but some were burned.

According to Martin, the toxic materials were carried about with bare hands and tossed into the oven. The technique was improved by spraying the fluid with a hose. The fire was helped along with compressed air.

Martin said that he had tried to file a report of a violation through a police acquaintance as early as 6 July, when they began burning the fluid. His friend's scraps of paper did not produce results because a policeman is an assisting official. Finally Martin found someone to pay for an analysis of his sample.

"I took a sample of the material that we were burning," Martin assured us. "I have two witnesses to the fact."

Martin said he was puzzled when a fellow worker's fingernails softened and his hands began to itch.

When one worker got sick, that got the production and safety chief to ban the burning of fluid. "The remaining waste material was deposited in barrels and cupboards for toxic materials, but the sludge was also washed down the drain," Martin asserted.

According to Martin, Nokia cleaned up the place when the fuss was raised. Among other things, the big sludge container was moved into the toxic materials shed, the organization of which has in other ways been improved.

As for information chief Zilliacus, he said that the worker never claimed that he got sick because of suspected toxins, but that during the police interrogations he felt that a possible reason was food poisoning.

#### PCB Waste to England

In the future they intend to start getting rid of PCB at the hazardous waste plant to be built in Riihimäki in early 1985.

Until then Suomen Onglemajate Oy [Finnish Hazardous Waste Company] plans to ship the waste to England. They intend to begin shipment as early as this month. The elimination from use of equipment containing PCB provided the impetus for the decision to export the waste.

According to the mapping effected by the committee appointed by the Interior Ministry, there are 110,000 condensers containing PCB in Finland. The committee has recommended that they be eliminated gradually.

11,466

CSO: 3617/161

## AERIAL SPRAYING IN FORESTRY MEETS INCREASED OPPOSITION

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 2 Aug 83 p 5

[Text] Oulu (HS)—The sort of brush war that took place at Hattuvaara near Ilomantsi threatens to repeat itself in Pello. The villagers of Juoksenki are threatening [the authorities] with barricades [not to] begin spraying the nearby forest from the air. The villagers intend to prevent the spraying plane from landing on the forest road by parking cars and tractors among other things on the runway.

The Juoksenki villagers are annoyed. Despite the opposition of the Pello Municipal Council, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry decided to permit spraying of the Palovaara area from the air. When the spraying begins on Tuesday, 9 August, the part owners of the Juoksenki common forest plan to destroy the aspen brush in the 90-hectare expanse cleared of timber.

The Palovaara timber stand was completely cut down over 10 years ago. Despite common forest owner attempts, evergreens have not taken root; instead they have been supplanted by dense aspen brush. The logging area is located about 25 km south of Pello.

Opposed to aerial spraying, the villagers feel that the brush herbicide may get into the surrounding waterways even as far as the Tornio River via forest ditches and brooks.

The villagers also wonder why mechanical brush clearing is not favored in the north since there is an abundant supply of labor. The rate of unemployment in Pello, for example, is right now 20 percent, the second largest in our entire country.

"Aerial spraying destroys the villagers' berries, the picking of which is an excellent additional source of income in areas with high unemployment," said Matti Voipio of Pello.

According to Aune Syvaniemi, who is from Juoksenki, Palovaara is reindeer grazing land and the local reindeer owner associations have adopted a negative position with regard to aerial spraying.

The ministry's permissive attitude toward aerial spraying came as a complete surprise to the Juoksenki villagers. The villagers felt certain that the municipal council's negative decision, by a vote of 14 to 13, would bury plans for the aerial spraying of the common forest. But things went otherwise: The ministry denied the Pello residents' petition because of insufficient documentation. The arguments required by the herbicide law, on the basis of which a spraying permit may be denied, were lacking.

In the opinion of opponents of aerial spraying, commune veterinarian Pekka Salminen's statement as well as the local environmental protection associations's memo were deliberately omitted from the letter that was mailed to the ministry.

"We didn't understand in the commune that the omission of those statements would mean denial of the petition to ban [spraying]. We thought that the ministry would look into the matter again before coming to a decision," Pello municipal secretary Martti Tuohino said.

At the Juoksenki village meeting they decided to file a protest with the attorney general and the parliamentary legal counsel on the basis of confusion in connection with the handling of the permit.

In the opinion of the part owners of the Juoksenki common forest, aerial spraying is the only alternative for destroying the brush; it would be too costly to do it by machine. The Lapland District Forestry Board also defends aerial spraying.

"The Kemi, Tornio and Pello forest tracts constitute the most important Lapland forest area. In our opinion, forest care work is best realized with the aid of aerial spraying. It is very doubtful that brush clearing could be accomplished as a make-work project -- our experiences indicate that it would not be accomplished that way," chief forester Eljas Pohtila of the District Forestry Board said.

According to Pohtila, aerial spraying costs a fourth of what machine clearing does. "In the Pello area aerial spraying costs 250 markkas a hectare, whereas machine clearing would cost 1,000 markkas a hectare. If there are over 10,000 thickets per hectare, the cost of machine clearing rises to 2,000," Pohtila said.

#### Brush Herbicide for 17,000 Hectares

This year a total of 17,000 hectares of saplings will be sprayed. Of that number, 2,100 hectares will be sprayed from the air. Spraying from the ground has not been a subject of dispute and petitions should be submitted only with regard to aerial spraying. Sprayings will begin this month.

This year at least 13 communes in the area have advised the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry of their rejection of aerial spraying. A ban was approved this year for only one 30-hectare area, which was considered to be too close to a waterway. The ministry has generally approved sprayings before too.

According to the current system, the party who wants aerial spraying sends his permit application to the commune. If the commune does not want to approve it, it can petition the ministry to ban aerial spraying in the area. According to the provisions of the law, the commune must assume a position on each application for aerial spraying individually and present arguments as to why, in the opinion of the commune, it cannot be approved. The ministry also considers each case individually and requests opinions from the district forestry boards.

At the present time a bill is under consideration according to which the commune would itself be permitted to decide on opinions issued by the provincial government and the district forestry board with regard to applications for aerial spraying that have been submitted. According to the bill, complaints about a commune decision may be registered with the Ministry of Agriculture.

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END